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We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous
bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of
systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift
the allocation towards these bidders, and can also generate higher revenue. We propose
a model, which extends the theory of private value auctions with heterogeneous bidders
to capture participation decisions, that can account for these qualitative effects of
auction format. We then calibrate the model using parameters estimated from the data
and show that the model can explain the quantitative effects as well. Finally, we use the
model to provide an assessment of bidder competitiveness, which has important
consequences for auction choice.
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Auction design has become increasingly important in many markets. A central,
and frequently debated, design issue concerns the relative performance of open and
sealed bid auctions. This choice comes up in structuring sales of natural resources,
art and real estate, in auctioning construction and procurement contracts, and in
asset liquidation sales.
Economic theory provides on the one hand very little and on the other hand
perhaps too much guidance on the merits of open and sealed bid auctions. The sem-
inal result in auction theory, Vickrey’s (1961) Revenue Equivalence Theorem, states
that under certain conditions, the two formats have essentially equivalent equilibrium
outcomes. Speciﬁcally, if bidders are risk-neutral, have independent and identically
distributed values, and bid competitively, the two auctions yield the same winner, the
same expected revenue, and even the same bidder participation. In practice, how-
ever, these assumptions often seem too strong. Further work points out that as they
are relaxed, auction choice becomes relevant, with the comparison between open and
sealed bidding depending on both the details of the market (e.g. bidder heterogeneity,
entry costs, collusion, common rather than private values, risk-aversion, transaction
costs) and the designer’s objective (e.g. revenue maximization or eﬃciency).
There has been less progress in providing empirical evidence on the performance
of alternative auction designs. A diﬃculty is that many real-world auction markets
tend to operate under a given set of rules rather than systematically experimenting
with alternative designs. In this paper, we combine theory and empirical analysis
to study the use of open and sealed bid auctions to sell timber from the national
forests. The U.S. Forest Service timber program provides an excellent test case in
market design as it has historically used both open and sealed auctions, at times even
randomizing the choice. The timber sale program is also economically interesting in
its own right. Timber logging and milling is a $100 billion a year industry in the
U.S.,1 and about 30% of timberland is publicly owned. During the time period we
study, the federal government sold about a billion dollars of timber a year.
A long-standing debate surrounds the design of federal timber auctions. An early
s t u d yb yM e a d( 1 9 6 6 )a r g u e dt h a to p e na u c tions generated less revenue. In 1976,
1This number is from the U.S. Census and combines forestry and logging, sawmills, and pulp and
paperboard mills (NAICS categories 113, 3221 and 321113).
1Congress proposed the use of sealed bidding. The implementation of the law, how-
ever, allowed forest managers to use open auctions if they could justify the choice.
As a result, sale method has varied geographically. In the Paciﬁc Northwest, the
largest Forest Service region, open auctions have predominated apart from a short
period following the 1976 law. We focus instead on the neighboring Northern region
comprised of Idaho and Montana, and provide additional evidence from California;
both areas used a mix of formats during our sample period, 1982-1990.
The theoretical component of our analysis highlights two departures from the
standard independent private value auction model, departures that are especially
salient for timber auctions. First, we allow bidders to have heterogeneous value
distributions. Here, we are motivated by the substantial variation among participants
in Forest Service auctions, where the bidders range from large vertically integrated
forest products conglomerates to individually-owned logging companies. Second, we
explicitly model participation by making it costly to acquire information and bid in
the auction. Modeling participation adds realism, and more importantly gives rise to
new testable hypotheses about entry patterns.2
Our baseline model assumes that ﬁrms behave competitively. Under this assump-
tion, auction format has no eﬀect on entry, allocation and revenue when bidders are
homogenous. With heterogeneous bidders, however, sealed bidding promotes entry
by weaker bidders and can discourage entry by stronger bidders. Sealed bidding also
shifts the allocation toward weaker bidders.
To see why sealed bidding favors weaker bidders, observe that with an open auc-
tion, the entrant with the highest value always wins. This makes weak bidders hesi-
tant to spend money to participate if strong bidders are also likely to be present. In
contrast, in a sealed bid auction, strong bidders have a relatively large incentive to
shade their bids below their true valuations, so a weaker bidder can win despite not
having the highest valuation. This handicapping eﬀect promotes the entry of weaker
bidders and discourages the entry of strong bidders. We observe, however, that only
weak bidder entry is likely to be aﬀected if bidders have similar costs of entry.
2Maskin and Riley (2000) provide the seminal analysis of asymmetric ﬁrst-price auctions with
ﬁxed participation. Several papers study entry decisions in auctions with symmetric bidders, but
discussion of entry with asymmetric bidders has been limited to examples. Milgrom (2004, chapter
6) provides an insightful overview. See also Arozamena and Cantillon (2004) for an analysis of ex
ante investment by heterogeneous bidders.
2The competitive theory does not generate unambiguous predictions about revenue.
Existing examples suggest that with a ﬁxed set of heterogeneous bidders, revenue
is often (but not always) higher with sealed bidding. Endogenous entry generates
an additional complication because participation varies with the auction format. A
revenue comparison, therefore, depends on all the primitives of the model: the bidders’
value distributions together with entry costs. Consequently one of our goals is to
estimate these primitives in order to compare the revenue gain (if any) from sealed
bidding to the eﬃciency distortion that sealed bidding induces in both entry and
bidding.
Our empirical investigation of timber auctions has two parts. The ﬁrst part ex-
amines the qualitative predictions of our theory and quantiﬁes the eﬀect of auction
format on observed outcomes. The second part exploits an additional assumption
about behavior, namely that in sealed bid auctions, bidders behave according to our
competitive theory. We estimate the primitives of the model under this assumption,
and use our estimates to assess whether the theory can account for the quantitative
diﬀerences across formats we observe in the data, as well as to quantify the trade-oﬀs
in revenue and eﬃciency suggested by theory. Throughout, we classify the bidders
into two groups: “mills” that have manufacturing capacity and “loggers” that do
not. We provide a variety of evidence that mills tend to have higher values for a
given contract than logging companies, which have to re-sell the timber.
We ﬁnd that, conditional on sale characteristics, sealed bidding induces signiﬁ-
cantly more participation by loggers. Mill entry is roughly the same across auction
formats in the Northern forests, and somewhat lower in the sealed bid auctions in
California. We also ﬁnd that sealed bid auctions are more likely to be won by loggers;
this eﬀect is substantial in the California forests and smaller (and only marginally
signiﬁcant) in the Northern forests. Finally, we measure winning bids to be 12-18%
higher in the sealed bid auctions in the Northern forests. In the California forests,
the diﬀerence is small and cannot be statistically distinguished from zero.
Although the theoretical model is qualitatively consistent with these results, it is
less clear whether it can account for the quantitative diﬀerences. In particular, the
question arises of whether the competitive bidding model can reconcile both the large
revenue gap in the Northern forests, and the minimal revenue eﬀect in California. To
address this, we consider alternatives to the baseline competitive model. We argue
3that several factors that seem plausible in the context of timber auctions, but are
omitted from our baseline model, such as common values and bidder risk-aversion,
are not good candidates to rationalize our ﬁndings. Instead, we focus on the possibility
that behavior is not fully competitive in open auctions.
Bidder collusion has been a long-standin gc o n c e r ni nt i m b e ra u c t i o n s ;t h ep r e -
vailing view is that open auctions are more prone to collusion because bidders are
face-to-face and can respond immediately to opponents’ behavior. For this reason,
we extend the theory to allow for collusion by mills at open auctions. We show
that collusion at open auctions need not aﬀect the model’s predictions for entry and
allocation, but increases the predicted revenue diﬀerence between auction formats.
In the ﬁnal part of the paper, we turn to a quantitative assessment of the al-
ternative theories. We build on the techniques pioneered by Guerre, Perrigne and
Vuong (2000) to recover the distributions of bidder values from the sealed bidding
data, under the assumption that observed bids are set to maximize proﬁts against
the empirical bid distribution. We also estimate the distribution of logger entry in
sealed bid auctions, and combine this with the proﬁts implied by the estimated value
distributions to recover estimates of entry costs.
We use these estimates to make (out-of-sample) predictions about what would
happen in open auctions under alternative behavioral assumptions, and we compare
these predictions to the actual open auction outcomes. This allows us to consider
several questions, including whether the theoretical model can explain the departures
from revenue equivalence observed in the data, whether open auction behavior seems
more consistent with competitive bidding or a degree of collusion, and whether bidder
competitiveness might diﬀer across regions.
O u rr e s u l t ss u g g e s tt h a tt h ee s t i m a t e dm odel can do plausible job of explain-
ing both the diﬀerences in participation and the diﬀerences in allocation we observe
across formats. We also ﬁnd that neither the assumption of perfectly competitive
behavior, nor an assumption that mills collude perfectly at open auctions, can match
the observed open auction prices in the Northern Forests. Rather, the data appear
consistent with a mild degree of cooperative behavior on the part of participating
mills. In contrast, the competitive bidding model appears to ﬁt the open auction
prices in California relatively well.
Turning to the welfare diﬀerences between open and sealed bid auctions, we ﬁnd
4that for a ﬁxed set of participants, our calibrated model predicts relatively small
discrepancies between sealed bid auctions and competitive open auctions. Sealed bid
auctions raise more revenue, and distort the allocation away from eﬃciency and in
favor of loggers, but the eﬀects are small (less than 1%). The diﬀerences are somewhat
larger when we account for equilibrium entry behavior: we predict that sealed bidding
increases revenue by roughly 5% relative to a competitive open auction, at minimal
cost to social surplus. Strikingly, even a mild degree of collusion by the mills at open
auctions – the behavioral assumption most consistent with the observed outcomes
in the Northern forests – results in much more substantial revenue diﬀerences (on
the order of 20%). This suggests that bidder competitiveness merits considerable
attention in the choice of auction format.
Our paper is the ﬁr s te m p i r i c a ls t u d yw ea r ea w a r eo ft h a tf o c u s e so nd i ﬀerential
entry and the importance of bidder heterogeneity across auction formats.3 Several
prior studies have looked directly at revenue diﬀerences between open and sealed bid
timber auctions. Johnson (1979) and Hansen (1986) study sales in the Paciﬁc North-
west following the passage of the 1976 sealed bidding mandate. They reach conﬂicting
conclusions: Johnson ﬁnds that the sealed bid auctions raised more revenue, while
Hansen argues that the diﬀerences are insigniﬁcant after accurately accounting for
sale characteristics. The episode is not, however, an ideal testing ground. As Hansen
points out, the choice of auction format during this period was sensitive to lobbying,
creating a potentially severe endogeneity problem that is hard to address empirically.
Moreover, one might naturally be skeptical of testing equilibrium predictions in an
unexpected and transient episode.
Subsequently, Schuster and Niccolucci (1993) and Stone and Rideout (1997) looked,
respectively, at sales in Idaho and Montana and in Colorado. Both papers ﬁnd higher
revenue from sealed bid auctions. A nice feature of Schuster and Niccolucci’s paper
is that they exploit the often-random assignment of auction format in some of the
Northern forests. Though we address a broader set of questions and take a somewhat
diﬀerent perspective, we have drawn on their work to select our data sample.
Our work also relates to the empirical literature on collusion at auctions. A variety
3Indeed, most analyses of auctions assume that bidders are symmetric. A few notable excep-
tions study asymmetries in auctions with ﬁxed participation, including Bajari (1997), Brannman
and Froeb (2000), Pesendorfer (2000), Hortacsu (2002), Jofre-Benet and Pesendorfer (2003), and
Brendstrup and Paarsch (2003a, 2003b).
5of approaches have been suggested to assess whether bidding data are consistent
with models of competition or collusion.4 Some approaches require prior knowledge
about the existence and structure of a cartel, while others interpret departures from
symmetric bidding behavior as evidence of collusion. Our method diﬀers in that we
use behavior under one set of auction rules as a benchmark from which to evaluate
the competitiveness of behavior under an alternative set of rules.
Finally, the last part of this paper shares features with the empirical literature
that uses entry decisions to recover estimates of ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions (Bresnahan
and Reiss, 1987; Berry, 1992). This literature uses entry decisions to draw inferences
about proﬁt functions relative to a normalized distribution of entry costs, as a function
of market-speciﬁc covariates. In contrast, we ﬁrst estimate post-entry proﬁts from
ﬁrms’ pricing decisions (i.e. their bids), and use entry decisions only to recover the
sunk costs of participation. This approach allows us to fully recover the parameters
of our model in dollar terms.
2. Comparing Auctions: Theory
This section develops the theoretical model we use to frame our empirical analysis.
Our starting point is the heterogeneous private values setting studied by Maskin and
Riley (2000). With an eye toward the empirical patterns outlined above, we expand
their analysis to make participation endogenous and to incorporate possible collusion
in open auctions. In this exercise, there are numerous speciﬁc modeling choices to
be made. To ease exposition, we begin with a baseline model, then discuss how the
results change under alternative assumptions.
A. The Model
We consider an auction for a single tract of timber. Prior to the sale, the seller
announces a reserve price r and the auction format: open ascending or ﬁrst price
sealed bid. There is a set N of potential risk-neutral bidders. Each bidder i has a
private cost ki of gathering information and entering the auction. By paying ki, bidder
4Examples include Porter and Zona (1993, 1999), Bajari and Ye (2003), Pesendorfer (2000);
see Bajari and Summers (2002) for a survey. Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997) also analyze
collusion in U.S. Forest Service timber auctions using data from open auctions; they argue that
collusion provides a better ﬁt than competition.
6i learns his (private) value for the tract, vi, and may bid in the auction. We refer to
bidders who acquire information as participants, and denote the set of participants
by n.
Entry costs and values are assumed to be independent across bidders. We model
entry costs as draws from a common distribution H (·)w i t hs u p p o r t[ k,k], and each
bidder i’s value as a draw from a distribution Fi with support [v = r, vi].5 Anticipating
our empirical analysis, we allow for two kinds of bidders. Bidders 1,...,N L are Loggers
and have value distribution FL, while bidders NL+1,...,N L+NM are Mills and have
value distribution FM. We assume that FM stochastically dominates FL according
to a hazard rate order, so we sometimes refer to the mills as strong bidders and the
l o g g e r sa sw e a kb i d d e r s .





We adopt a standard model of the bidding process. In an open auction, the price
rises from the reserve price and the auction terminates when all but one participating
bidder has dropped out. With sealed bidding, participating bidders independently
submit bids; the highest bidder wins and pays his bid. For both auctions, we as-
sume that bidders make independent decisions to acquire information, but learn the
identities of other participants before submitting their bids.6
A strategy for bidder i consists of a bidding strategy and an entry strategy.A
bidding strategy bi(·;n)s p e c i ﬁes i’s bid (or drop-out point in the case of an open
auction) as a function of his value and the set of participating bidders. An entry
strategy speciﬁes whether he should participate as a function of his entry cost. An
optimal entry strategy is a threshold rule, with bidder i entering if and only if his
cost lies below some threshold Ki.
A type-symmetric entry equilibrium is a pair of bidding strategies bL(·;n),b M(·;n)
and entry cost thresholds KL,K M with the property that: (i) loggers use the strat-
egy bL,K L and mills the strategy bM,K M; (ii) each bidder’s bid strategy maximizes
his proﬁts conditional on entering; and (iii) each bidder ﬁnds it optimal to enter if
5The assumption that the reserve price equals the lowest possible value is easily relaxed.
6This assumption is not essential. Indeed an earlier version of the paper assumed bids were
submitted without information about opponent’s participation. There we showed the same results
under a modiﬁcation of Assumption (ii).
7and only if his entry cost lies below his cost threshold. As is often the case with
entry models, there may be many equilibria; as a result, our results compare sets of
equilibria across auction methods.
B. Sealed Bid Auctions
We analyze the sealed bid auction in two steps. We ﬁrst characterize optimal
bidding for an arbitrary set of participants. We then characterize equilibrium entry.
To focus on the main ideas, we defer proofs to the Appendix.
Suppose i is a participating bidder with value vi. His expected proﬁti s :
π
s






where Gj(b;n) is the probability that j will bid less than b. In equilibrium, bid
strategies will be continuous and strictly increasing, so Gj(b;n)=Fj(b
−1
j (b;n)).









The ﬁrst order conditions, together with the boundary condition that bi(r;n)=r
for all i, uniquely characterize optimal bidding strategies (Maskin and Riley, 2000).
These bid strategies are type-symmetric.
To identify the equilibrium entry thresholds, observe that a bidder should enter
whenever his expected proﬁt exceeds his entry cost. Given a set of entry thresholds











Pr[n | K,i ∈ n], (3)
where Pr[n | K,i ∈ n] is the probability that the set of participants will be n given
that i enters and opponents use their speciﬁed entry strategies.







8Proposition 1 A type-symmetric entry equilibrium exists in the sealed bid auction.
In equilibrium: (i) mills submit higher bids: GM(b;n) ≤ GL(b;n) for all b, despite the
fact that (ii) mills shade their bids more than loggers: bM(v;n) ≤ bL(v;n) for all v.
The ﬁrst part of the Proposition states that mills will tend to submit higher bids
than loggers. The second part states that mills shade their bids more than loggers, a
natural result given that the mills face weaker competition. The consequence is that
a logger may win despite not having the highest value. We will show that, relative to
an open auction, this provides an extra incentive for loggers to participate.
C. Open Auctions
We now turn to the open auction. We initially consider the case where behavior
is competitive, and discuss collusion below.
In an open auction, it is a dominant strategy for each participant to bid until
the price reaches his valuation. Therefore bi(v;n)=v for all bidders i.B i d d e r i’s









where Gj(b;n)=Fj(b) is the probability that j bids less than b.
We identify equilibrium entry just as in the sealed bid case. Bidder i’s expected











Pr[n | K,i ∈ n].
In equilibrium, each bidder enters if his expected proﬁt exceeds his entry cost. So the







Proposition 2 A type-symmetric entry equilibrium exists in the open bid auction.
In equilibrium, (i) mills submit higher bids: GM(b;n) ≤ GL(b;n) for all b;a n d( i i )
all entrants bid their true value: bi(v;n)=v for all v.
9In equilibrium, mills bid more than loggers. Moreover, the open auction is eﬃcient
in the sense that the participant with the highest value always wins. As we will see,
this tends to discourage the entry of weaker bidders relative to the sealed bid case.
D. Comparing Auction Formats
We now present our main comparative results. As a point of reference, we start
with the case where the bidders have identical value distributions and use identical
strategies in equilibrium. Here, an extension of the revenue equivalence theorem
implies that the two formats have equivalent outcomes.
Proposition 3 (Revenue Equivalence) If bidders are homogenous, so FL = FM,t h e
sealed bid and open auction each have a unique symmetric entry equilibrium, in which
the highest valued entrant wins the auction. These equilibria have (i) the same ex-
pected entry, and (ii) the same expected revenue.
Revenue equivalence breaks down if bidders are heterogeneous. To analyze this
case, we exploit the relationship between a bidder’s equilibrium proﬁts and his prob-





Pr[i wins | vi = x;n]dx.( 7 )
This representation holds for both auction formats; it follows from applying the en-
velope theorem to the optimization problems (1) and (5).
We saw above that in a sealed bid auction with heterogeneous bidders, mills
shade their bids more than loggers, while all bidders use the same strategy in an open
auction. Therefore for any given set of opponents, a logger has a greater chance to
win a sealed auction and hence higher expected proﬁts. The argument is reversed for
mills, leading to the following result.
Proposition 4 For any type-symmetric entry equilibrium of the sealed bid auction,
there is a type-symmetric entry equilibrium of the open auction in which: (i) loggers
are less likely to enter; (ii) mills are more likely to enter; (iii) it is less likely a logger
will win.7
7The statement of the result is complicated slightly by the fact that there may be several type-
symmetric entry equilibria for each auction format. If both formats have a unique entry equilibrium,
loggers necessarily enter and win more with a sealed format.
10Because the sealed bidding equilibrium distorts the allocation toward loggers, only
the open auction is eﬃcient given a set of participating bidders. The next Proposition
states that the eﬃciency of the open auction extends to entry.
Proposition 5 (Eﬃciency) The socially eﬃcient type-symmetric strategy proﬁle is
an entry equilibrium of the open auction, but every sealed auction equilibrium is in-
eﬃcient.
As noted earlier, there is no general theoretical comparison for expected revenue.
Existing examples suggest that when participation is ﬁxed, sealed bid auctions often,
but not always, result in higher revenue (Maskin and Riley, 2000; Li and Riley,
1999). In principle, endogenous entry could tip the revenue comparison either toward
sealed bidding (if the primary entry eﬀe c ti so nl o g g e r s )o rt o w a r do p e nb i d d i n g( i f
the primary entry eﬀect is on mills). Therefore a revenue comparison demands a
carefully parameterized model, which we develop in Section 5.
E. Collusion in Open Auctions
Collusion in open auctions has been a long-standing concern in Forest Service
timber auctions (Mead, 1966; U.S. Congress, 1976; Froeb and McAfee, 1988; Baldwin
et al, 1997). Here we consider the possibility of collusion by the mills in open auctions.
As collusive schemes can take many forms, we assume for concreteness that par-
ticipating mills at an open auction are able to collude perfectly, so the participating
mill with the highest value bids his value, while the other mills register as participants
but do not actively bid. Loggers simply bid up to their value. We maintain the as-
sumption that bidders make independent participation decisions, so mills anticipate
colluding with other participating mills, but do not coordinate entry.8
Fixing the set of participants, collusion clearly will lower revenue and increase mill
proﬁts. It has no eﬀect on who wins the auction or on logger proﬁts, because only
the high-valued mill is relevant in this regard. Nevertheless, collusion gives mills a
greater incentive to participate, and this in turn can crowd out logger participation.
8There are forms of collusion, such as bid rotation, that involve coordinated entry. We have
looked for evidence of this in our data by checking whether the entry of pairs of mills or loggers is
negatively correlated conditional on sale characteristics. There are a handful of pairs for which entry
is signiﬁcantly negatively correlated, but for the vast majority of pairs negative correlation can be
rejected.
11Proposition 6 (Collusion) For any type-symmetric entry equilibrium of the open
auction, there is a type-symmetric collusive equilibrium in which: (i) Loggers are less
likely to enter; (ii) Mills are more likely to enter; (iii) It is less likely a logger will
win. Thus, for any type-symmetric entry equilibrium of the sealed bid auction, there
is a type-symmetric collusive equilibrium of the open auction where (i)-(iii) hold.
An important point is that relative to equilibrium outcomes of the sealed bid
auction, the competitive and collusive outcomes of the open auction look qualitatively
similar (lower prices, less logger entry, fewer sales won by loggers). The diﬀerence is
one of magnitude.
F. Discussion of Modeling Choices
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss a few of our modeling choices. We ﬁrst discuss
our model of entry. We then consider two factors omitted from the model: common
values and bidder risk-aversion.
Concentrated versus Dispersed Entry Costs
Our model assumes that bidders diﬀer in their entry costs. In principle the dis-
tribution of these costs could be dispersed or highly concentrated; this distinction is
relevant for interpreting the results.
If entry costs are dispersed, every potential bidder will be “marginal” in the sense
of having a probability of entry strictly between zero and one. In this case, a change in
the auction format that changes all bidders’ expected proﬁts will aﬀect the equilibrium
entry behavior of both mills and loggers.
In contrast, if entry costs are concentrated so that all bidders have essentially
the same entry cost, mills and loggers cannot both be marginal because conditional
on entry mills expect higher proﬁts than loggers. In equilibrium, either mills will
be roughly indiﬀerent to entering while no loggers enter (clearly not the appropriate
assumption for our data), or loggers will be roughly indiﬀerent while mills always
enter.9 In the latter case, mill participation will be unaﬀected by auction format,
9In the former case, participating bidders are homogenous so revenue equivalence holds across
auctions. A third possibility is that all bidders agree on whether or not entry is proﬁtable. In this
case, the set of participating bidders is eﬀectively ﬁx e di nag i v e na u c t i o n .Af o u r t ha n ds o m e w h a t
perverse possibility is that all loggers enter, and given this, mills strictly prefer not to enter. We
disregard this possibility.
12while logger participation will be strictly higher with sealed bidding. An interesting
consequence is the eﬀect of sealed bidding on revenue via its eﬀect on participation
will always be positive.
Common Values and Risk-Aversion
In timber auctions, diﬀerences in bidder costs and contractual arrangements pro-
vide a source of private value diﬀerences. At the same time, bidders can obtain private
estimates of the quality and quantity of timber, which suggests a potential “common
value” component as well (Athey and Levin, 2001).10 Haile (2001) studies how resale
markets in timber auctions can lead to common values even if the underlying envi-
ronment has private values. In the presence of common values, expected revenue is
higher in open auctions, at least with symmetric bidders.
Bidder risk-aversion also has implications for the comparison between open and
sealed bid auctions (Matthews, 1987). If bidders are symmetric and have CARA
or DARA preferences, expected revenue is higher with a sealed bid auction, while
participation is higher at open auctions. It is plausible that bidders at Forest Service
timber auctions might exhibit risk-aversion; Athey and Levin (2001) provide some
indirect support for this based on the way observed bids are constructed.11
Without dismissing the possibility of either common values or bidder risk-aversion,
we decided not to focus on them in our theoretical model for two reasons. First,
incorporating either greatly complicates the analysis. Second, our empirical results
suggest that neither common values nor risk-aversion are the primary cause of the
departures we observe from revenue equivalence.
3. Timber Sales
The U.S. Forest Service has historically used both open and sealed bid auctions
to sell timber from the national forests. In this section, we describe the mechanics of
10Athey and Levin (2001) show that in certain Forest Service auctions, bidders can proﬁtf r o m
acquiring commonly relevant information about timber volumes. They also show, however, that the
potential rents are competed away, suggesting that the equilibrium information asymmetry about
volumes may not be quantitatively large.
11See also Perrigne (2003) for evidence of risk aversion from French timber auctions.
13a timber sale, the data for our study, factors that relate to the auction format, and
how we classify competing bidders.
A. The Timber Sale Process
Our data consists of timber sales held between 1982 and 1990 in Lolo and Idaho
Panhandle National Forests, neighboring forests on the Idaho/Montana border. These
are the two forests in the Forest Service’s Northern region with the largest timber
sale programs. They make a good test case for comparing auction formats because
they use a mix of open and sealed auctions and the tracts sold under the two formats
appear to be relatively homogenous. We discuss the way auction format is determined
in more detail below. In Section 4C, we provide additional evidence from forests in
the Paciﬁc Southwest region. These California forests also use both open and sealed
bidding, but the auction format varies more systematically with the size of the sale,
which makes controlling for tract diﬀerences more challenging.
In both regions, a sale begins with the Forest Service identifying a tract of timber
to be oﬀered and organizing a “cruise” to estimate the merchantable timber. The sale
is announced publicly at least thirty days prior to the auction. The announcement
includes estimates of available timber and logging costs, tract characteristics and a
reserve price.12 It also states whether the auction will involve open or sealed bids. In
some cases, the Forest Service restricts entry to ﬁrms with less than 500 employees.
We do not consider these small business sales – in principle the bidders are more
homogenous than in regular sales, removing what we believe to be a crucial factor in
distinguishing open and sealed sales.
Before the auction, the bidders have the opportunity to cruise the tract and pre-
pare bids. For sealed bid sales, the Forest Service records the identity of each bidder
and their bid. For open auctions, ﬁrms must submit a qualifying bid prior to the
sale.13 Typically these bids are set to equal the reserve price. The Forest Service
records the identity of each qualifying ﬁr m ,a sw e l la st h eh i g h e s tb i de a c hq u a l i ﬁer
oﬀers during the auction.
12The reserve price is computed according to a formula that uses the cruise estimates of timber
value and costs, and adds a ﬁxed margin for proﬁta n dr i s k .
13This institutional setting is unusual in that there is a record of all bidders in the open auction,
even if not all bidders actively bid at the auction. Clearly, the set of bidders must be accurately
observed in open auctions for our entry comparisons of open and sealed auctions to be meaningful.
14Once the auction is completed, the winner has a set amount of time — typically one
to four years in our sample – to harvest the timber. Some of the sales in our sample
are “scale sales” meaning the winner pays for the timber only after it is removed
from the tract. The fact that payments are based on harvested timber, but bids
are computed based on quantity estimates means there can be a gap between the
winning bid and the ultimate revenue. Athey and Levin (2001) study the incentive
this creates for strategic bidder behavior. For the scale sales in our sample, we have
limited harvest data, so we use the bid price as a proxy for revenue. The remaining
sales are “lump-sum” sales. In these sales the winner of the auction pays the bid
price directly.
B. Data Description
For each sale in our sample, we know the identity and bid of each participating
bidder, as well as detailed sale characteristics from the Forest Service sale announce-
ment. Table 1 presents some basic summary statistics.
Focusing on the full sample, there are some obvious diﬀerences between the open
and sealed bid auctions. The average sale price per unit of timber (in 1983 dollars per
thousand board feet of timber or $/mbf) is roughly $80 in the sealed auctions and $70
in the open auctions. The number of entering logging companies is also somewhat
higher in sealed auctions (3.4 versus 2.6), while the number of entering mills is slightly
lower (1.2 versus 1.5). Contracts sold by sealed auction are more likely to be won by
a logging company than tracts sold by open auction.
These numbers are broadly consistent with the model presented above. At the
same time, the Table indicates that the trac t ss o l db yo p e na u c t i o na r en o ti d e n t i c a l
to those sold by sealed bid. While the per-unit reserve price of the timber is similar
across format, the open auction tracts tend to be larger. The average open auction
has an estimated 2893 mbf of timber, while the average sealed bid sale has only 1502
mbf. This suggests that we need to understand how the sale format is decided and
control for tract characteristics to isolate the eﬀects of auction format.
C. Choice of Sale Method
In Forest Service timber sales, the choice of sale method is made locally by forest
managers. One reason for focusing on the two Northern forests is that Schuster and
15Niccolucci (1993) report that the choice of sale format was explicitly randomized for
a subset of these sales. In one forest district the format apparently was determined
by picking colored marbles out of a bag. Unfortunately, we do not know precisely
how the randomization procedure varied across forest districts and over time. We
get similar empirical results using the subsample that Schuster and Niccolucci (1993)
identify as randomized, though our estimates are somewhat less precise due to the
smaller sample size.14
To better understand the determinants of sale method in our sample, we consider
a logit regression where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the auction
is sealed bid and equal to 0 if the sale is an open auction. We include a large set
of observable tract characteristics, including the reserve price and the Forest Service
estimates of the volume of timber, its eventual selling value, and the costs of logging,
manufacturing and road-building. We also include the density of timber on the tract,
the contract length, whether the sale is a salvage sale, and a Herﬁndal index of the
concentration of species on the tract. To capture market conditions, we include the
number of U.S. housing starts in the previous month and the number of logging ﬁrms
and sawmills in the county of the sale, as counted by the U.S. Census in the past
year. Finally, we construct a measure of “active bidders” for each sale by identifying
all ﬁrms that bid in the forest district in the prior 300 days. We use the number of
active loggers and mills to proxy for the number of potential bidders.15 We also include
dummy variables for the year of the sale, the quarter of the sale, the forest district
in which the sale took place and if major species were present. We are particularly
14Within our two forests, we include more districts and years than those Shuster and Nicolluci
identify as randomized (they focus on 1987-1990). In including these additional years, our motivation
is that the set of tracts sold by open and sealed bidding appear to vary mainly with size, time and
location, precisely the characteristics we need to control for in any case with the randomized sales.
We focus on the two largest Northern forests because timber markets in Idaho and Montana are
quite local due to the geography, while tract characteristics also vary with geography as well, making
it diﬃcult to eﬀectively control for heterogeneity in forests with fewer sales.
15In terms of capturing potential competition, these measures probably suﬀer from a degree of
measurement error. Apart from the fact that logging ﬁrms may go in and out of business without our
knowledge, the Forest Service data records bidder names with a variety of spellings and abbreviations.
D e s p i t es a l eb ys a l ec h e c k i n go ft h en a m e sa n dc r o s s-referencing with industry reference books, in
t h ec a s eo fﬁrms that appear few times it is sometimes hard to distinguish whether two bidders in
distinct sales are really the same ﬁrm. This is less of problem with mills as they generally appear
many times. Note that for the California sales, we use the forest rather than the district as a unit
of analysis, as there are fewer sales per forest.
16sensitive to the importance of sale size, so rather than simply assuming a linear or
quadratic eﬀect, we specify its eﬀect as a step function with 10 steps that roughly
correspond to deciles in the data.
The results are reported in Table 2. As expected, sale size is a signiﬁcant correlate
of auction method. Even after controlling for time and geographic location, smaller
sales tend to be sealed bid, while larger sal e st e n dt ob eo p e na u c t i o n s . M o r e o v e r ,
diﬀerent forest districts use somewhat diﬀerent sale methods on average.
Because sale method varies with observable sale characteristics, we want to control
for these characteristics in comparing the outcomes of the open and sealed bid auc-
tions. A concern is that, even controlling for tract characteristics ﬂexibly, some open
sales in our data may look very “unlike” any sealed bid sales and conversely some
sealed sales may look unlike any open sales. This will be reﬂected in having some sales
for which, conditional on characteristics, the predicted probability of being sealed or
open according to our logit regression will be close to zero or one. Figure 1 plots a
smoothed histogram of these predicted probabilities, also called the propensity score.
As can be seen, there are some sales that are cause for concern. To alleviate this in
our empirical analysis below, we drop sales that have a propensity score below 0.075
or above 0.925. This results in dropping 129 open auctions and 8 sealed auctions.16
A problem we cannot easily solve is that the choice of auction method may depend
on characteristics of the sale observed by the bidders and the Forest Service, but not
in our data. In this case, a regression of entry or revenue on auction method, even
controlling for observed characteristics, may have an endogeneity problem. We discuss
this possibility at more length in Section 4E.
D. Bidder Heterogeneity: Mills and Loggers
We try to capture the diversity of bidders by distinguishing between mills, which
are larger and can process at least some of the timber themselves, and logging com-
panies, who must re-sell all the timber they harvest. This distinction is just one of
several we could draw, but in practice it turns out to be similar to other natural
classiﬁcations. For instance, we have categorical data on ﬁrm employment and ﬁnd
that if we break the ﬁrms into large and small employers, we arrive at very nearly at
16The dropped sales are generally large volume sales in districts that ran few sealed auctions. This
criteria leads us to drop a larger fraction of sales in California, where sale method correlates more
closely with sale size.
17the same classiﬁcation.17 Mills also attend more auctions than most loggers, although
a few loggers attend frequently.
Our theoretical model assumes that mills tend to have higher willingness to pay
than loggers. An implication is that mills should submit higher bids and win dis-
proportionately. To check this, we focus on the sealed bid auctions. We regress the
per-unit bids (in logs) on a dummy for whether the bidder is a mill and auction ﬁxed
eﬀects. The coeﬃcient on the mill dummy is 0.239, meaning mill bids are 24% higher
on average, with a t-statistic of roughly 7. An entering mill is also more likely to win
than an entering logger (28% versus 21%).18
4. Comparing Auctions: Evidence
In this section, we investigate the consequences of auction choice for bidder par-
ticipation, revenue and allocation. Our empirical approach is fairly straightforward;
we describe it now before turning to the speciﬁc questions.
A. Empirical Approach
For a given outcome Y (such as the number of entering mills or loggers, or the
auction price per unit), suppose that
Y = f(SEALED,X,N,ε), (8)
where f is an unknown function, SEALED is a dummy equal to one if the auction is
sealed and zero if the auction is open, X is a vector of observed sale characteristics,
N =( NL,N M) is the number of potential bidders, and ε is unobservable.
A standard point is that to identify the average eﬀect of auction format, denoted
τY = EX,ε[f(1,X,N,ε) − f(0,X,N,ε)], we require that the unobserved component
17The employment data are somewhat noisy, but to convey a rough sense, suppose we classify
bidders as “large” if they have more than XX employees. Then of the 1536 appearances by mills in
our data, 1311 are by mills that are large. In constrast, only 467 of 3097 logger appearances are by
large ﬁrms.
18Mills also have a higher entry rate than loggers (which is a feature of the most natural equilibria
of our model), although our measurement of this suﬀers from the diﬃculty noted above of precisely
identifying potential bidders. Using our measure of potential bidders, the average sale had 5.1 po-
tential mill entrants and 1.3 actual mill entrants, and 19.5 potential logger entrants and 3.0 actual
logger entrants.
18of the outcome is independent of the auction format conditional on covariates. This
clearly holds for the randomly assigned sales in our sample (although it is important
that the administrative unit that assigned the format is included in X,g i v e nt h a t
assignment probabilities diﬀered by forest district).19 It holds for the other sales if
the choice of format is based on information from the Forest Service appraisal, or
follows some rule based on covariates in our data.20
Perhaps the most obvious approach to estimating τY is to use ordinary least
squares regression for the speciﬁcation
Y = α · SEALED+ Xβ+ Nγ+ ε. (9)
This approach is easily interpretable, but there are caveats. First, (9) does not
allow the eﬀect of sealed bidding to vary across tracts. To remedy this, we also
report estimates from a speciﬁcation where we interact SEALED with the individual
covariates and compute its average eﬀect for the sample. A second issue is that we
must specify the functional form for the covariates to be included in X.W h i l eo u r
results are not very sensitive to the alternatives we have tried, in principle mis-
speciﬁcation could lead to bias.21
Motivated by this concern, we also report a set of estimates using a matching
estimator. Because the matching estimator gives consistent estimates using a diﬀerent
19Otherwise, we could mis-estimate the eﬀect of sealed bidding if, for example, a forest district
with especially valuable tracts also used a high fraction of sealed-bid sales. This is a shortcoming of
Schuster and Niccolucci (1993)’s analysis: they control for only a limited set of tract characteristics,
and so even for the randomized sales, the estimates they provide may not represent the causal eﬀect
of the auction format.
20If the forest manager uses a deterministic rule, such as using an open auction if and only if the
volume of timber exceeds a threshold (which seems a possible description of some areas in California),
then in principle auction format will not vary conditional on X. In practice, if our speciﬁcation of
X does not exactly match the rule, we will estimate Pr(SEALED|X)t ob ei n t e r m e d i a t ef o rs a l e s
close to the cut-oﬀ. So long as unobserved sale chacteristics are independent of the assignment
conditional on X, we will still be identiﬁed in a manner analogous to a “regression discontinuity”
approach, whereby discontinuous changes in the outcomes in response to changes in x close to the
threshold will be attributed to auction format.
21There are really two concerns. First, if the covariates associated with open and sealed sales are
fairly diﬀerent, we will rely on our functional form assumptions to extrapolate what the outcome in
one format would have been, had the auction been held using the other format. This concern mo-
tivates the procedure of selecting a subsample of sales with intermediate propensity scores. Second,
if for instance sale volume is correlated with the auction format, a failure to ﬂexibly control for sale
volume might lead us to falsely impute a revenue eﬀect of auction method.
19approach than OLS, it provides a useful robustness check. This estimator matches
every sealed bid auction with the M “closest” open auctions and vice versa, with
closeness being measured as a weighted distance between sale characteristics.22 It
then compares the outcome of each sale t, Yt, with the average outcome of the matched












(ˆ Yt − Yt),
where Ts and To are the number of sealed and open sales. We implement this es-
timator, setting M = 4, and compute robust standard errors following Abadie and
Imbens (2004).
B. Evidence from Northern Forests
We begin our empirical analysis by looking at how auction choice aﬀects the
entry patterns of mills and loggers in the Northern forests. The model suggests that
controlling for sale characteristics there should be more entry by loggers and either the
same or less entry by mills. Table 3A reports our estimates (as well as our estimates
of how auction choice eﬀects other outcomes).
Conditional on sale characteristics, we estimate that sealed bid auctions attract
10-16% more logger entrants than open auctions. This translates roughly into 3-4
additional loggers for every 10 sales. All three point estimates are highly signiﬁcant.
In contrast, sale format appears to have little eﬀect on entry by mills. Conditional
on sale characteristics, our estimated eﬀect is small and statistically cannot be dis-
tinguished from zero in all speciﬁcations.
The third column of Table 3 reports estimates of how auction format aﬀects the
fraction of entrants who are loggers. Consistent with the entry results, the compo-
sition of bidders at sealed bid auctions is shifted toward loggers. On average the
fraction of participants who are loggers is 5-8% higher in sealed bid auctions than in
open auctions.
Given this shift in bidder composition, it is natural to expect that sealed bid
22We use the metric ||x||W =( x0Wx)1/2,w h e r eW is a diagonal matrix consisting of the inverses
of the variances of the covariates x. Thus the distance between two vectors of covariates x and z is
||x −z||W. We include the estimated propensity score for each auction as a covariate in addition to
our standard set of characteristics.
20auctions should be more likely to be won by loggers. The fourth column of Table
3 reports our estimate of this eﬀect. Our point estimates range from a 3.4%-7.4%
greater chance that a logger will win if the auction is sealed bid. These estimates
are at best marginally statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, although our point estimates
are not insubstantial, we cannot rule out a fairly small eﬀect of auction format on
allocation.
Finally, we turn to revenue. The ﬁfth column of Table 3A reports our estimates
of the eﬀect of auction format on the sale price per unit volume. We ﬁnd that after
controlling for sale characteristics, sealed bid prices are 14-18% higher than open
auction prices. Again, all three point estimates are all highly signiﬁcant. To get a
sense of the magnitude of this eﬀect in dollar terms, note that the average winning
bid (in 1983 dollars rather than 1983 dollars per unit volume) is just over $144,000.
So a 14% diﬀerence in the winning bid price translates into a $20,000 diﬀerence in
Forest Service revenue per sale, or about $19 million for the whole sample.
A natural question is whether the revenue diﬀerence is due to sealed bid auctions
attracting more bidders. The ﬁnal column of Table 3A reports estimates of the sale
price that include the number of entering loggers and mills as covariates. Even con-
trolling for the number of entrants, sale method appears to matter. In the regression
estimates, sealed bid auctions generate roughly 7% (s.e. 3%) more revenue. The
matching estimator suggests a slightly larger revenue eﬀect of 13% (s.e. 5%). The
table does not report the revenue decomposition, but the estimates suggest that an
additional mill is associated with about a 19% increase in the winning bid, while an
additional logger is associated with about a 12% increase in the winning bid. Note
that some caution is warranted in interpreting this revenue decomposition because
there may be sale characteristics that are observed by the bidders but not accounted
for in our data. In this case, the number of entrants may be endogenous in this
regression.23
C. Evidence from California Forests
While the Northern forests seem particularly well-suited to making a statistical
23An approach followed in the auction literature is to instrument for the number of entering bidders
using measures of potential competition. We experimented with this, but found that our estimated
coeﬃcients were highly sensitive to the particular choice of potential competition measures, none of
which are ideal.
21comparison between auction methods, we would like to draw on additional evidence
as well. To this end, we also examined sales from California forests in the Forest
Service’s Paciﬁc Southwest Region. We consider sales that took place between 1982
and 1989. We have data on 1188 open auctions and 694 sealed bid auctions.
While the Forest Service sale process is similar in California and the set of potential
bidders includes both ﬁrms with manufacturing capability and logging companies,
this sample is somewhat less ideal. The reason, which can be seen in the summary
statistics in Table 1B, is that the tracts sold by sealed bid auction tend to be quite
diﬀerent from those sold by open auction. The principal diﬀerence is in the size of
sales. The average sale volume for the open auctions is over 6000 mbf, while it is
closer to 700 mbf for the sealed bid auctions. The sealed bid auctions are also more
likely to be salvage sales. The per unit reserve prices are similar across sale formats.
The second column of Table 2 reports a logit estimate of the choice of sale method,
using our standard controls. As is apparent in the summary numbers, volume is a
highly important correlate of sale method. Sale method also varies signiﬁcantly across
the twelve forests in the region. The extent to which sale method correlates with
sale characteristics can also be seen in Figure 1B, where we plot the density of the
propensity score for the open and sealed bid auctions. Our logit regression predicts
the sale method of many of the open auctions with near-perfect precision; this is
mainly a function of the fact that very large sales are almost certain not to be sealed
bid.
As with the Northern forests, we again drop sales that have an estimated propen-
sity score below 0.075 and above 0.925. This dramatically reduces the sample and
leaves us with 212 open auctions and 269 sealed bid auctions. Figure 1B illustrates
how, relative to the full sample of California sales, the selected sample has much more
overlap in the distribution of estimated propensity scores. And as can be seen in Ta-
ble 1B, the selected sample has much smaller diﬀerences across sale format. Still,
the remaining diﬀerences require carefully controlling for covariates in estimating the
eﬀect of auction format on diﬀerent outcomes.
With this caveat in mind, we turn to Table 3B, where we report estimates of the
eﬀect of auction method on entry, revenue and allocation outcomes. The results for
entry are similar to the Northern forests. Sealed bid auctions attract more loggers.
The regression models give an estimate of 11-12% more loggers at sealed sales, which
22translates into an additional 3 loggers participating for every 10 sales. The matching
estimate is a bit larger – 4.7 additional loggers for every 10 sales. We also ﬁnd that
mills are somewhat less likely to participate in sealed bid sales. Our point estimate
from the regression model indicates that sealed bid sales attract 1.3 fewer mills for
every 10 sales, but the estimate is not statistically signiﬁcant. The matching estimate
is larger in magnitude: 3 fewer mills for every 10 sales, and this estimate is statistically
signiﬁcant. As in the Northern forests, the composition of bidders shifts signiﬁcantly
toward logging companies with sealed bidding – here by 8-15%.
Our estimates of the eﬀect of auction method on allocation also are qualitatively
similar, but larger, than those in the Northern forests. In the California forests, we
estimate that there is roughly a 8-14% greater chance a logger will win with sealed
bidding.
A notable diﬀerence between the California results and those for the Northern
f o r e s t si st h a tw ed on o tﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of auction method on revenue in
California. The regression estimate is slightly positive, the matching estimate slightly
negative. Neither are large or statistically insigniﬁcant, and the same is true after
controlling for the number of entering mills and loggers.
D. Explaining the Departures from Revenue Equivalence
Our empirical evidence suggests that in both the Northern and California forests
there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the outcomes of sealed bid and open auctions.
Conditional on sale characteristics, sealed bid auctions attract more entry by logging
companies, with either a negligible change in the entry of mills (Northern region) or
a decrease in their participation (California). Sealed bidding also appears more likely
to result in the auction being won by a logging company – particularly in California.
Finally, after controlling for sale characteristics, the winning bids in the sealed bid
sales are appreciably higher in the Northern forests (14-17%), but similar to open
auction prices in California. It is in the eﬀect of auction method on sale price that
the two regions diﬀer most noticeably.
At a qualitative level, the theoretical model developed earlier in the paper can
rationalize all of these ﬁndings. The model predicts that logger entry will be higher in
sealed bid sales, that loggers are more likely to win a sealed bid sale, and that sealed
bid sales may result in greater revenue. Moreover, the key assumption generating
23these departures from revenue equivalence, that bidders are heterogeneous, also seems
consistent with the data.24
What we cannot say at this point, however, is whether a reasonable parametriza-
tion of the model can match our quantitative ﬁndings. Moreover, recall that the
theory predicts qualitatively the same diﬀerences between open and sealed bidding
regardless of whether the mills are able to collude in open auctions, a primary con-
cern that has historically motivated the use of sealed bidding in Forest Service timber
auctions. Without a more quantitative approach to the model, we cannot distinguish
between its competitive and collusive versions. We try to address this shortcoming
in the next section by estimating the model’s parameters directly from the data and
then comparing the quantitative predictions of the theories to the data.
E. Alternative Explanations
Ad i ﬀerent explanation for our ﬁndings is that our estimates do not reﬂect the
systematic eﬀects of auction format, but rather some confounding correlation between
auction choice and unobserved aspects of the sale that also aﬀect the outcome. This
is certainly a concern. Even in the Northern forests, where many sale assignments
were random, we may not have perfectly controlled for sale diﬀerences. And as we
have noted the diﬀerences are greater in California. We have attempted to mitigate
this by making use of the very rich data on sale characteristics in the Forest Service
sale reports, augmented by further data on market conditions.
Could it be the case that some omitted variable is generating our ﬁndings? Several
of the most obvious stories have problems themselves. For instance, one possibility
is that forest managers like to sell more valuable tracts by sealed bid, a bias that
would help to explain the entry and revenue diﬀerences we ﬁnd. This story is hard to
square, however, with the fact that larger sales, which are by deﬁnition more valuable
on a total value basis, are more often sold by open auction. A second possibility
is that forest managers use sealed bid sales when they expect more bidder interest,
especially on the part of logging companies. This would help to explain the entry
results, though it is not clear to us why forest managers would systematically behave
24Above, we reported comparisons between mills and loggers for the Idaho and Montana sales. In
California, mill bids are just over 10% higher on average, after controlling for auction ﬁxed eﬀects,
and the diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant. Mills are also more likely more likely to participate and to
win conditional on participating.
24in this way. Indeed, industry lore is more consistent with a scenario where the mills
prefer oral auctions (as predicted by our theory), and where forest managers defer to
the mill’s preferences.25
Turning from endogeneity to behavioral explanations, recall that our theoretical
model abstracted from two potentially relevant aspects of timber auctions: common
values and bidder risk-aversion. Could either of these explain our empirical ﬁnd-
ings? While our results certainly do not ru l eo u tt h ep r e s e n c eo fc o m m o nv a l u e so r
bidder risk-aversion (or both), it seems unlikely that either is primary source of the
departures we observe from revenue equiva l e n c e .W i t hc o m m o nv a l u e s( a n dw i t h o u t
the other elements of our model, namely bidder heterogeneity and collusion), prices
should be lower in sealed auctions, rather than higher as we observe in the data.
Risk-aversion might be able to explain the observed prices, but it would also suggest
that participation should be lower in the sealed bid auctions, rather than higher. So
to the extent that either common values or bidder risk-aversion would help to explain
our ﬁndings, they would have to be part of a more complicated story.
5. Structural Estimation and Testing
Our ﬁnal goal is to assess quantitatively the relationship between our ﬁndings and
the theory we proposed to account for them. We investigate three related issues. First,
we ask whether a calibrated version of our model, with parameters estimated from the
data, can quantitatively match the departures we observe from revenue equivalence.
Second, we ask whether the model can provide a measure of bidder competitiveness in
t h eo pe na u c t i o n s .F i n a l l y ,w ee s t i m a t et h ew e lfare consequences of moving exclusively
to open or sealed bidding, under the assumption that our estimated model accurately
describes the sale environment.
The key elements of our approach are as follows. We use entry and bidding data
from the sealed bid auctions to estimate the parameters of our theoretical model –
the value distributions of loggers and mills, and the costs of entry – as functions
of observed tract characteristics. To do this, we assume competitive behavior in the
sealed bid auction as outlined above. We also allow for unobserved heterogeneity in
25The Forest Service Handbook also instructs forest managers to use sealed bidding if they expect
as a l enot to be competitive.
25the underlying values of the tracts. We then use the calibrated model to predict the
equilibrium outcome of each sale in our sample and compare the predictions to the
actual outcomes. For tracts sold by sealed bidding, this provides a measure of how
well our model ﬁts the data. For tracts sold by open auction, the predictions are
out-of-sample because the open auctions were not used to estimate the parameters of
the model.26 Comparing the predictions to outcomes allows us to assess whether the
model accurately accounts for the observed diﬀerences across auction formats. It also
provides a way to evaluate the competitiveness of open auctions. Finally, we develop
a welfare comparison of open and sealed bidding. Paralleling the previous section, we
focus on sales in the Northern forests and discuss California sales later.
A. Structural Estimation
Our ﬁrst step is to use the sealed bid data to estimate the parameters of the
theoretical model as a function of tract characteristics. To estimate the value distri-
butions of mills and loggers, we build on the approach pioneered by Guerre, Perrigne
and Vuong (2000). They suggest ﬁtting a distribution to the observed sealed bids,
then using the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal bidding to recover the bidders’ value
distributions. Given the value distributions, we can estimate entry costs using ob-
served entry behavior.
We modify Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000)’s approach in order to account
for unobserved heterogeneity in auction characteristics.27 Formally, we let u denote
an auction characteristic known to participating bidders but not observed in our
data. Let X denote the set of sale characteristics known both to the econometrician
26In fact, Athey and Haile (2002) show that when values are correlated, as in our model of
unobserved heterogeneity, underlying value distributions cannot be identiﬁed from bidding data in
open auctions. Haile and Tamer (2003) point out additional concerns with drawing inferences from
losing bids in open auctions.
27We are motivated to include unobserved heterogeneity because there is signiﬁcant positive cor-
relation among bids in the sealed auctions conditional on observed auction covariates. We also
believe it is reasonable to assume that bidders can commonly observe certain features of a tract
that make it more or less valuable. An alternative way to rationalize correlation in bids is with a
aﬃliated values model, e.g. where bidders receive a one-dimensional signal and cannot disentangle
the common component from their idiosyncratic preferences. Krasnokutskaya (2002) exhibits sim-
ulations whereby, relative to assuming independent values and unobserved heterogeneity, using the
assumption of aﬃliated values when estimating values from bidding data leads to larger inferred
values, which would increase predicted revenue in open auctions and thereby magnify the revenue
diﬀerence in our sample.
26and the bidders, and let N =( NL,N M) represent the number of potential mill and
logger entrants. We write the bidders’ value distributions, conditional on (X,u,N),
as FL(·|X,u,N)a n dFM(·|X,u,N).
I nl i n ew i t ho u rm o d e l ,w ea s s u m et h a tb idders’ values, and hence their bids,
are independent conditional on (X,u,N). As we assume the set n =( nL,n M)o f
participating bidders is observed prior to bidding, we write the equilibrium bid dis-
tributions as GL(·|X,u,N,n)a n dGM(·|X,u,N,n). If there is a single bidder, we
assume he optimally bids the reserve price, but otherwise we treat the reserve price
as non-binding.28
Also in line with our model, we assume that bidders have independent entry costs
concentrated around some average cost K(X,N), and that in equilibrium loggers are
the marginal participants regardless of auction format. This of course means that
the number of potential and actual mill entrants is identical, nM = NM.29 Note that
under these assumptions, we can infer exactly the number of potential mill entrants,
rendering our earlier proxy – the number of “active” mills – irrelevant. Finally, we
maintain the standard assumption that auctions in our sample are independent of
one another.
Estimating the Bid Distributions
Conditional on the observable sale characteristics (X,N)a n ds e to fp a r t i c i p a n t sn,
the joint distribution of bids in a given auction is a combination of three distributions:
the bid distributions GL(·|X,u,N,n)a n dGM(·|X,u,N,n) and the distribution of the
unobserved auction heterogeneity u, which is responsible for any covariation of the
bids. We adopt a parametric approach to estimate these three distributions.
28See Haile (2001) for a discussion of why Forest Service reserve prices are typically non-binding.
A slight drawback to this assumption is that our ﬁtted bid distributions will assign positive (though
typically small) probability to bids below the reserve price. We did experiment with modeling bidder
values (and hence bids) as being distributed above the reserve price, but found that this model ﬁt
the data poorly, possibly because the mechanical formula used to determine the reserve price may
not track changes in bidder values over time or across auctions well.
29In principle, it would also be possible to estimate a model of dispersed entry costs, where both
logger and mill entry would be stochastic. Identifying an entire distribution of entry costs, however,
would additional extrapolation across auctions as well as an instrument that aﬀe c t sv a l u e sb u tn o t
entry costs. We judged this too much to ask of our data. Note that our current approach implies
that mill entry will not vary with auction format. This is not a problem for the Northern region,
but is not a perfect ﬁt for California.
27After extensive experimentation, we settled on a speciﬁcation of Weibull bid dis-










Here λk(·)i st h es c a l e ,a n dpk(·) the shape, of the Weibull distribution, parametrized
as lnλk(X,N,n)=XβX + NβN + nβn,k + β0,k and lnpk(n)=nγn,k + γ0,k.30,31
We assume u has a Gamma distribution with unit mean and variance θ,a n di s
independent of X, N, and n.32 We estimate the parameters (β,γ,θ)b ym a x i m u m
likelihood; the likelihood function is written out in the Appendix. The estimates for
the Northern region are reported in Table 4A.
Several points about the estimated bid distributions deserve mention. First, recall
that the basic assumption of the theory was that mill values stochastically dominate
logger values, and an implication was that mill bids should dominate logger bids. Our
empirical speciﬁcation does not impose this. Nonetheless, we ﬁnd that mill bids do
dominate those of loggers. On average, mill bids are roughly 25% higher than logger
bids. Also consistent with the theoretical model, we ﬁnd that bids are increasing
in the number of competitors (a property that can potentially be violated if bidder
values are aﬃliated or have a common value component). Finally, we estimate that
u has signiﬁcant variance, indicating that our modeling of unobserved heterogeneity
across auctions is warranted.
One natural question concerns the appropriateness of the Gamma-Weibull func-
30The speciﬁcation we adopt is more parsimonious than in our earlier regressions. Our results do
not seem sensitive to including additional covariates; nevertheless, we opted for parsimony because
of the need to make out-of-sample predictions where over-ﬁtting could in principle be a problem.
31Specifying how the number of participants should aﬀect the bid distribution is a challenge in
two-stage structural estimation of auction models, because there is no easy way to incorporate the
theoretical restriction that the value distributions be independent of the number of bidders. Theory
does predict that mill behavior could be quite diﬀerent if there is only a single mill, which motivates
us to include a single mill eﬀect in the mill bid distribution. Theory also predicts that the eﬀect of
an additional bidder on a given bidder’s behavior should be limited as the number of bidders grows.
For this reason, use min{nL,n} and min{nM,n} in place of nL,n M in our estimates, where n =5 .
32Implicitly then, u is observed only once bidders acquire information. The assumption that u is
orthogonal to (X,N,n) is strong, but should be viewed in light of most empirical work on auctions,
which makes the even stronger assumption that there is no unobserved heterogeneity at all.
28tional form. Initial experimentation, and our desire to include a rich set of covariates
and unobserved auction heterogeneity, led us toward a parametric approach.33 In
addition, existing non-parametric methods typically propose to estimate bid dis-
tributions separately for each set of participants (nL,n M); we do not have suﬃ-
cient data to do this. We considered several parametric alternatives, each sharing
the property with the Gamma-Weibull that bid i in auction t could be written as
bit =e x p ( XtβX +NtβN)·εit(n) with some parametric family for the joint distribution
of the residuals εit(n). We examined how each alternative matched the observed dis-
tribution of logger and mill bids, the within-auction bid correlation, and the observed
sealed bid prices.
The Gamma-Weibull form appeared to provide a good ﬁt on all dimensions. To
provide a sense of this, Figure 2 plots the distribution of sealed bid residuals in our
sample (i.e. the distribution of the ˆ εits, where ˆ εit = bit/exp(Xtˆ βX + Ntˆ βN)) next to
the distribution predicted by our ﬁtted model. The overall mean of the bid residuals is
26.8; the variance is 15.6; the between-auction variance is 12.4 and the within-auction
variance is 9.6. By way of comparison, the ﬁtted model predicts a mean of 26.4, and
respective variances of 16.1, 12.7 and 9.3. We provide further evidence on how the
model ﬁts prices and logger and mill bids in Table 5, discussed below.
Estimating the Value Distributions
We now turn to recovering the bidders’ value distributions. Under the assumption
that the observed bids are consistent with equilibrium behavior, each bid must be
optimal against the opponents’ bid distributions. That is, a bidder’s value vi is
related to his observed bid bi through his ﬁrst-order condition for optimal bidding:







It is straightforward to construct an estimate of φi given our estimates of GL and
GM. If all sale characteristics (X,u,N,n) were observed, we would then be able to
33For models without unobserved heterogeneity, Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) propose a
non-parametric approach to estimate the bid distributions, while Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003)
use a Beta-Weibull speciﬁcation. Our approach builds on Krasnokutskaya (2002), who introduces
unobserved heterogeneity in a semi-parametric model under that assumption that bidder values are
additively or multiplicatively separable in u. Bidder values do not have that property in our model.
29infer the bidder value corresponding to each observed bid, and thus recover the value
distributions (as in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong, 2000). As u is unobserved, however,
we need to modify the approach. As observed by Krasnokutskaya (2002), we can still





Figure 3 plots the density functions for logger and mill values for an auction with
average covariates, and u = 1, as well as the equilibrium bid functions assuming two
mills and two loggers participate in the auction.35 As the Figure indicates, the distri-
bution of mill values is substantially shifted rightward from the distribution of logger
values. Moreover, the estimated mill bid function is below the logger bid function.
Thus mills bid less than loggers for any given value, matching a key prediction of the
theoretical model.36
It is also possible, by averaging across values of u, to estimate the typical markups
built into the sealed bids in our data. We estimate that across mill bids, the median
proﬁt margin is 10.4%; for loggers the median proﬁtm a r g i ni s9 . 0 % .
Estimating Entry Costs
The remaining parameter of the model is the entry cost, which we recover using
the equilibrium entry condition. Recall that when entry costs are concentrated and
loggers are the marginal participants as we have assumed, then in equilibrium each
logger will be nearly indiﬀerent to participating. In particular, a sealed bid entry equi-
librium requires that K(X,N) ≈ Πs
L(X,N), where K(X,N) is the average entry cost
as a function of observed sale characteristics (assumed to be independent of auction
34A small subtlety here is that our theoretical model implies that the equilibrium bid distribution
will have a ﬁnite upper bound. The Weibull distribution does not. For this reason, we truncate the
very upper tail of the estimated distributions GL(·)a n dGM(·) and work with the truncated distri-
butions. The motivation for this and details of the implementation are described in the Appendix.
35To compute these, we started with the ﬁtted bid distributions GL(·|X,u,N,n)a n d
GM(·|X,u,N,n), with X = X, N = N, u =1a n dn =( 2 ,2), then used the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion to recover the bid functions bk(v|X,u,N,n)=φ
−1
k (v|X,u,N,n).
36Note that this ﬁnding requires more than an ordering of means or a ﬁrst-order stochastic dom-
inance ordering; rather, it reﬂects an ordering of the reverse hazard rates, gM/GM ≥ gL/GL.
30format) and Πs
L(X,N) is the equilibrium proﬁt a logger expects from entering.37








L(X,N,n)Pr[n|X,i ∈ n,N,s]. (12)
The ﬁrst term, ¯ πs
L(X,N,n), is a logger’s expected proﬁt conditional on sale charac-
teristics and the set of participants. We compute this number from our estimate of
the value and bid distributions, integrating out the unobserved auction heterogeneity.
The second term, Pr[n|X,i ∈ n,N,s], is the equilibrium probability that a logger
entering a sealed bid auction (denoted by s) assigns to the set of participants being
n, conditional on sale characteristics (X,N). To estimate this term, we model the
number of entering loggers as a Poisson random variable with mean µ(X,N), param-
eterized as µ(X,N)=XαX + NαN.38 As before, we use our measure of “active”
loggers to proxy for the potential logger entrants. We estimate µ(X,N)u s i n gt h e
entry data from the sealed bid auctions in our sample; the estimates are reported in
Table 4. We also know that all potential mill entrants will enter in equilibrium, so
nM = NM. We therefore assume ﬁrms face no uncertainty about mill entry.
Putting this all together, we use (12) to obtain the predicted logger proﬁts from
a sealed bid auction, Πs
L(X,N), as a function of the characteristics (X,N). Then,
treating each tract in our sample as an (X,N) pair, we impute for each tract an
entry cost equal to K(X,N)=Πs
L(X,N). We estimate a median entry cost of $4695
(s.e. $1132). As the costs of surveying a tract can run to several thousand dollars,
this seems reasonably consistent with our prior beliefs about the costs of acquiring
information.39
B. Comparing Predicted and Actual Outcomes
Having estimated the parameters of the theoretical model as functions of observ-
able sale characteristics, we now ask how closely the model’s equilibrium predictions
37N o t et h es l i g h tc h a n g eo fn o t a t i o nf r o mt h et h e o r e t i c a lm o d e l ;w en o wi n c l u d ec o v a r i a t e sX,N
as an argument of the proﬁt function, and suppress the entry threshholds.
38In theory, the distribution of logger entrants is binomial because loggers make independent entry
decisions. As we do not have a very good measure of the number of potential logger entrants, we
use the poisson speciﬁcation to approximate the binomial.
39As a point of comparison, we estimate that across tracts in our sample the median expected
mill proﬁt from a sealed bid auction is roughly $45,000 gross of entry costs.
31match the observed outcomes in our data. In the case of sealed bid sales, this exercise
provides a measure of how well we have ﬁt the entry and bidding data. In the case of
open auctions, it allows us to ask whether the calibrated model can explain the open
auction outcomes, and in particular, whether assuming some degree of cooperative
behavior provides a more accurate ﬁt to the data. Finally, by looking at both kinds
of sales, we can assess whether the model is able to explain not just the qualitative
but the quantitative departures from revenue equivalence documented earlier.
To generate sealed bidding predictions, our estimated Poisson model of logger
entry gives the equilibrium distribution of loggers who will participate in a sealed
bid auction as a function of tract characteristics. The number of mill entrants is
known and not stochastic. We use our estimates of GL,G M and the distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity to predict bidding behavior conditional on participation.
Finally we combine the entry and bidding predictions to predict outcomes conditional
only on tract characteristics.
To generate open auction predictions, we observe that conditional on participa-
tion, each entrant will bid his value, and the auction price will equal the second
highest value. Alternatively, if mills collude, all but the highest value mill drop out
immediately, and the remaining bidders behave competitively. These observations
allow us to calculate expected prices and proﬁts for a given tract, and any given set
of participants, under both the assumption of competitive and collusive behavior, by
repeated simulation. Each simulation involves drawing a value of u,t h e nd r a w i n ga
value for each participant from either FL(·|X,u,N,n)o rFM(·|X,u,N,n), and ﬁnally
calculating the auction price, proﬁts and surplus.
This gives predicted open auction outcomes for each tract conditional on any hy-
pothetical set of participants. To predict open auction entry, we continue to treat
mill entry as known and not stochastic. We assume, as we did earlier, that the equi-
librium distribution of logger entrants can be approximated as a Poisson distribution.
For each tract, we ﬁnd the Poisson parameter for which the expected logger proﬁts
from entering just equal the entry cost. This yields a prediction of the equilibrium
distribution of logger entrants, which we combine with our bidding predictions, to
generate predicted outcomes as a function of observed tract characteristics.
Table 5 reports the actual average outcomes in our sample and the average out-
32comes predicted by our parameterized model.40 For the tracts sold by sealed bid
auction, we closely predict the average bids of loggers and mills. In reality, the av-
erage bids are $57.6 and $101.0. The model predicts averages of $56.6 and $101.5
per mbf unconditionally (i.e. given just sale characteristics), and $55.8 and $101.5
conditional on the set of participating bidders. We also closely predict the average
auction prices and average sale revenue. The model somewhat under-predicts the
fraction of sales that loggers win – both the unconditional prediction of 64.5% and
the prediction of 67.0% conditional on realized entry undershoot the actual number
of 68.7%.
Of course, it should not be too surprising that the model accurately predicts the
sealed bid outcomes because its parameters are estimated from the sealed bid data.
The more demanding test of how well the theory can ﬁt the observed outcomes is to
compare the open auction outcomes predicted by the model to the actual outcomes.
In this case, we asking the model to make predictions that are “out-of-sample” in two
senses: we are predicting sale outcomes for tracts not used to estimate the model’s
parameters, and also for a diﬀerent auction format than that used to estimate the
model’s parameters.
We start by comparing the model’s predictions for entry and allocation to the
actual outcomes for the tracts sold by open auction. Strikingly, the model predicts a
level of logger entry that is very close to the actual level (2.89 loggers per sale versus
2.84 in reality), indicating that the ﬁtted model is able to explain the entry diﬀerences
between open and sealed bid sales in our data. The model is somewhat less successful
in matching the fraction of sales won by loggers. As with the sealed bid auctions, the
model under-predicts how often loggers win (the model’s prediction is that loggers will
win 53.0% of the sales, or 55.2% conditional on realized participation, while in reality
they win 60.0%). Note, however, that despite under-predicting logger purchases for
both sale formats, the model accurately captures the diﬀerence across the open and
sealed bid sales (the model’s prediction is 11.5% versus 8.7% in reality).
A key point for the open auctions is that under our assumption of concentrated
entry costs, the competitive and collusive equilibria diﬀer only in the price they
predict. Therefore to distinguish between a range of behavioral assumptions – from
40We generate the standard errors using a parametric bootstrap in which we re-sample from the
asymptotic distribution of the bid and entry distribution parameters reported in Table 4.
33competitive behavior by the mills, to perfectly collusive behavior, to any intermediate
degree of collusion that involves the highest-valued mill bidding up to his value – it
is necessary to focus on prices.
The numbers in Table 5 indicate that the observed prices in the open auctions
lie between the competitive and fully collusive prices predicted by the model. The
competitive model predicts an average price of $79.7, or $80.7 conditional on realized
entry. It predicts an average price of $51.7 per mbf if mills fully collude. In reality,
the average sale price across open auctions is $72.8 per mbf. Even accounting for
sampling error, we reject both the competitive and collusive models at conventional
conﬁdence levels. Thus the assumption of mildly cooperative behavior on the part
of participating mills seems to provide a better match than either the competitive or
fully collusive extremes.41 It is worth noting that this conclusion is not sensitive to
our assumption that the sealed bid auctions are competitive. If we assumed a degree
o fc o l l u s i o ni nt h es e a l e db i da u c t i o n s ,w ew o uld infer a higher distribution of bidder
values from the data. This would reinforce the ﬁnding that open auctions appear less
than perfectly competitive.
To summarize, it appears that the theoret i c a lm o d e ld e v e l o p e di nS e c t i o n2a n d
estimated using the sealed bid data does a reasonable job of explaining the diﬀerences
in outcomes across auction formats we observe in the data. The best ﬁt comes under
the assumption that mill behavior in open auctions is mildly cooperative.
C. Evidence from California Forests
To further assess the model’s ability to explain our empirical ﬁndings, we repeated
our analysis on the California sales. Here the conclusions regarding bidder competi-
tiveness are rather diﬀerent, with an assumption of competitive behavior providing a
plausible ﬁt to the data.
Table 4B reports our estimates of the entry and bid distributions for the California
sealed bid auctions. As in the Northern region, we ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences between
loggers and mills, and signiﬁcant unobserved heterogeneity across auctions. The
Gamma-Weibull bid distribution again appears to provide a good ﬁt to the data.
Figure 2B plots the density of bid residuals for the California sealed bid sales next to
41A possibility is that there is collusion at a small fraction of the sales. We should note, however,
that when we looked at the open auctions for which the predicted price is substantially above the
actual price, we did not ﬁnd any obvious pattern.
34the distribution predicted by the ﬁtted model, showing a reasonable match.42 Table
5B compares the actual outcomes of these auctions to those predicted by the ﬁtted
model. The model’s predictions of average logger and mill bids, average sale prices
and the fraction of sales won by loggers match the data fairly closely, while the model
somewhat over-predicts sale revenue relative to the realized outcome.
When we move to making out-of-sample predictions about the open auctions in
California, we ﬁnd that in contrast to the Northern region, the observed prices can
be described reasonably well under the assumption that ﬁrms bid competitively. The
average sale price in the California open auctions was $119.0. As reported in Table
5B, our ﬁtted model predicts an average price of $120.7 conditional on realized entry,
and $115.1 when we predict entry as well as bidding. The model also predicts logger
entry and the fraction of sales won by loggers with some accuracy. As with the
sealed bid sales, we somewhat over-predict sale revenue; the revenue diﬀerence across
formats is relatively close to the actual diﬀerence.
D. Quantifying the Trade-oﬀs in Auction Design
So far we have tried to assess if our theoretical model could explain the systematic
departures from revenue equivalence we observe in the data. We now take as given
that we have accurately estimated bidders’ values and entry costs, and we investigate
the welfare consequences of using either open or sealed bidding on an exclusive basis.
From an a priori standpoint, our theoretical results suggest that neither format will
dominate. The open auction conveys an eﬃciency beneﬁti nb o t he n t r ya n da l l o c a -
tion, but the increase in social surplus may come at the cost of lost revenue and an
allocation that favors stronger bidders. For this reason, it seems natural to try to
quantify the trade-oﬀs faced in choosing between the two formats.
To conduct a welfare comparison, we use our estimates of the primitives to com-
pute the predicted outcome of both an open auction and a sealed bid auction for
each tract in our sample. For each tract, and each auction format, we compute the
expected entry, the expected price and revenue, the probability that a logger will win,
and the expected surplus (the value of the winning bidder net of entry costs sunk by
42In terms of the covariance structure of the bid residuals, the observed mean in our sample is
11.2; the variance is 6.9; the between-auction variance is 4.8; and the within-auction variance is 4.2.
Our ﬁtted distribution predicts a mean of 11.0, and corresponding variances of 6.2, 4.9 and 3.7.
35all the bidders). For the open auction format, we consider two alternative speciﬁca-
tions of mill behavior: a benchmark speciﬁcation where mills behave competitively,
and perhaps a more realistic speciﬁcation where they cooperate 25% of the time (25%
being the number that rationalizes the observed open auction prices in the Northern
region).
Our comparisons are reported in Tables 6A and 6B. The top panel reports the
expected auction outcomes taking participation as ﬁxed and computing only the
corresponding bidding equilibrium. The bottom panel reports expected outcomes
when we solve for the complete entry equilibria of the alternative models.
A ﬁrst point that stands out is that if participation is assumed to be independent of
the auction format, the diﬀerences in equilibrium outcomes between open and sealed
bidding – assuming bidder behavior is competitive in both cases– are small, despite
substantial asymmetries among bidder types. Sealed bidding would generate more
revenue, but the revenue gain is only $651 per sale in the Northern region and $1018
in California. Sealed bidding also increases the probability that sales are won by
loggers, but the average increase in probability is less than 1%. Finally, the eﬃciency
beneﬁt to using an open auction format is also quite small, only $100 per sale in the
Northern region and $45 per sale in California.
These diﬀerences increase when we account for the fact that bidder participation
will vary systematically with auction format, though the estimates are also less pre-
cise. Under our assumption of concentrated entry costs, sealed bid and open auctions
will attract the same number of mills, but sealed bid auctions will attract between
3-6 more loggers for every 10 sales. One eﬀect of this additional entry is to generate
a more substantial diﬀerence in the fraction of sales won by loggers –we predict that
loggers would win 3-4% more sales with sealed bidding. A second eﬀect is to increase
the revenue advantage of sealed bidding to roughly $5300 (3%) for the average sale
in the Northern region and $26,000 (13%) in California. Our estimate of the social
surplus diﬀerential is quite noisy, so much so that our point estimates indicate higher
social surplus from sealed bidding, despite the fact that Proposition 5 shows that
sealed bidding is less eﬃcient.43
43The reason it is even possible to generate a positive point estimate here is that in practice we
estimate separate value distributions for each possible conﬁguration of entrants (nL,n M), and these
estimates are not precisely the same. As noted earlier, this is an issue anytime one uses current
two-stage auction estimation methods; it becomes visible here because in modeling stochastic logger
36As a practical matter, however, the model suggests that these diﬀerences are
dwarfed by the potential eﬀects of bidder collusion. In the Northern region, even if
we take participation as ﬁxed, open bidding generates some $22,000 less per sale than
competitive sealed bidding if mills are able to engage in a mild amount of cooperative
behavior. The diﬀerence is over $28,000 once we account for participation eﬀects.
So to the extent that mild cooperation by mills at open auctions is the behavioral
assumption that receives the most support from our data in this region, the revenue
beneﬁts of sealed bidding clearly seem to be the most quantitatively signiﬁcant wel-
fare consequence of the choice of auction method. In contrast, in California where
competitive behavior seems consistent with the observed outcomes, a welfare trade-oﬀ
between sale formats appears to hinge on relatively small diﬀerences.
6. Conclusion
This paper has examined the relative performance of open and sealed bid auc-
tions, using U.S. Forest Service timber sales as a test case in auction design. Our
main empirical ﬁnding is that sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift
the allocation toward these bidders, and in some forests generate higher revenue.
Our main theoretical contribution is an extension of the standard independent pri-
vate values auction model that can explain these ﬁndings, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, and also allows us to measure the degree of bidder competitiveness.
Our approach to structural estimation in this setting is novel in several ways.
First, motivated by a desire to match key features of the application, we use an ap-
proach that incorporates several elements (heterogeneous bidders, unobserved auction
heterogeneity, and a model of bidder participation) that have previously received at-
tention in isolation. Second, we exploit the variation in auction format to assess the
competitiveness of the open auction format. By relying only on data from sealed bid
auctions to estimate our primitives, we area b l et om a k eo u t - o f - s a m p l ep r e d i c t i o n s
for open auctions that can be compared to actual outcomes.
entry we need to take expectations that average over possible numbers of logger entrants, where the
weights on diﬀerent realizations of nL vary across auction formats. Note that we could take the
approach of averaging our value distribution estimates to create a pooled estimate, but this would
have the drawback that for any given set of participants, our pooled value distribution estimate
would not correspond through the ﬁrst order condition to the estimated bid distribution.
37Even though the role of asymmetries in determining optimal auction design have
received a fair amount of attention in the theoretical literature, our results show
that with ﬁxed participation, the choice of auction format has little impact even
with substantial asymmetries among bidders. When participation is endogenous, we
see that sealed bidding favors the small or weak bidders in both entry and allocation,
and diﬀerences across auction formats are magniﬁed. Finally, our results suggest that
competitiveness may vary across Forest Service regions, and that the implications of
competitiveness for auction choice may be quantitatively the most signiﬁcant.
Appendix I: Proofs of the Results
To begin, we establish existence of entry equilibrium.
Proposition 7 For both auction formats, a type-symmetric entry equilibrium exists.
Proof. For the sealed bid auction, Li and Riley (1999) show that for any set of
participants, there is a unique bidding equilibrium that is type-symmetric. The same
is true for the open auction if we restrict attention to undominated strategies. We
can use a single proof to show the existence of an entry equilibrium for both auc-
tion formats. Let Πi(K)denote´ ı’s proﬁts from entry assuming entrants use equi-
librium bid strategies. An entry equilibrium couples these strategies with a vector
K such that Πi(K)=Ki for all i. So establishing a type-symmetric entry equi-
librium amounts to ﬁn d i n gat y p e - s y m m e t r i cﬁxed point of Π =( Π1,...,Πn). Let
K = {(K ∈ [0,K]n : K1 = ... = KL,K L+1 = ... = KN} denote the space of type-
symmetric entry thresholds, where K ≥ k is large enough so that no bidder’s proﬁts
could exceed it. Now, Π : K → K and is continuous in K. So Kakutani’s ﬁxed point
theorem implies that Π has a ﬁxed point in K. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Equilibrium existence is shown above. Properties (i) and
(ii) follow from the analysis of Maskin and Riley.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .Equilibrium existence is shown above. Properties (i) and
(ii) follow from the fact that it is a dominant strategy for participants to bid their
values, and by Assumption (ii), FM(b) ≤ FL(b)f o ra l lb.
Proof of Proposition 3. Standard revenue equivalence results (see e.g. Milgrom,
2004) imply that for any ﬁxed set of participants n, the equilibrium surplus, and
the expected revenue and proﬁts of individual bidders will be identical across the
38two auction formats. Therefore Πs
i(K)=Πo
i(K). Moreover, Πi = Πo
i = Πs
i is
constant in Ki and decreasing in Kj,s oi ti sd e c r e a s i n gi nK when K =( K,...,K).
It follows that both auctions have a unique symmetric entry equilibrium that solves
Πi(K,...,K)=K. The results follow directly.
















Pr[i wins | vi = x,n,τ]dx.
In the sealed bid equilibrium bM(v;n) ≤ bL(v;n)f o ra l lv, while all bidders use
the same strategy in the open auction. Therefore if i is a logger:
Pr[i wins | vi, n, Open] ≥ Pr[i wins | vi, n,S e a l e d ] ,


















Graphical Depiction of Entry Equilibria
To proceed, we characterize type-symmetric entry equilibria of the open auction.
Consider the space {(KL,K M):Ki ∈ [0,K]} of type-symmetric entry thresholds. Let
39LL denote the locus of points (KL,K M)f o rw h i c hΠo
L(K) − KL =0 ,a n dd e ﬁne LM
accordingly. The intersections of LM and LL are the type-symmetric entry equilibria
of the open auction. Figure 1 depicts a unique equilibrium, but there may be several.
Now, observe that LL and LM are continuous, and downward sloping because Πo
i(·)
is decreasing in Kj.S oa b o v eLi, Πi(K) − Ki < 0 while below Li, Πi(K) − Ki > 0.
Moreover, if KM = K then ΠM(K) − KM < 0, so LM intersects the x-axis at some
KM < K.M o r e o v e r ,LL must be above the x-axis KM because Πo
L(K) > 0i fKL =0 .
A consequence is that for any point K =( KM,K L)a b o v eLL and below LM,t h e r e
must be an open auction equilibrium Ko with Ko
M ≥ KM and Ko
L ≤ KL.
To prove the result, suppose Ks is a type-symmetric entry equilibrium of the
sealed auction and is interior (a similar argument applies for boundary equilibria).








So Ks lies above LM,b e l o wLL (as in the Figure). Therefore there is a type-symmetric




L. Relative to the sealed
equilibrium, mills enter more, while loggers enter and win less. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . As o c i a l l ye ﬃcient entry and bidding proﬁle maximizes
social surplus. Givenp a r t i c i p a t i o n ,e ﬃcient bidding means each bidder uses an iden-
tical increasing bid strategy, so the bidder with the highest value wins. The sealed
bid auction already fails to be eﬃcient on these ground, but the open auction has
this property. We now show that open auction also involves eﬃcient entry.
To this end, observe that given a set of participants n,t h ee ﬃcient (and open
auction) surplus s(n) equals the expected highest value. Therefore, for any bidder
i ∈ n,




vj | vi ≥ vj ∀j ∈ n\{i}
¸
.
This just equals i’s expected proﬁt, denoted πi(n). If i/ ∈ n,t h e nc l e a r l yπi(n)=0 .








where ECi(Ki)=E[ki|ki ≤ Ki]H(Ki) is the expected entry cost sunk by i. Bidder









(s(n) − s(n\{i}))Pr[n|K] − ECi(Ki)
= S(K) − S(Ki = k,K −i).
Therefore dui/dKi = dS/dKi. It follows that given K−i the choice of Ki that
maximizes social surplus also maximizes i’s net proﬁts, so the socially eﬃcient entry
proﬁle is an entry equilibrium. The stated Proposition, however, involves a restriction
to type-symmetric proﬁles. To see why that poses no problem, let STS(KL,K M)
denote the social surplus from a type-symmetric proﬁle (KL,K M)( s oSTS(KL,K M)
equals S(KL,...,KL,K M,...,KM)). And assume K∗ is an eﬃcient type-symmetric
proﬁle:
K




If K∗ is interior (the proof is similar for boundaries), dSTS/dKL(K∗)=dSTS/dKM(K∗)=
0. Moreover, dSTS/dKL =
PL
i=1 dS/dKi and likewise for mills. Because S is symmet-
ric in logger thresholds and also in mill thresholds, it follows that dS/dKi(K∗)=0f o r
all loggers and all mills. Thus dui/dKi(K∗)=0f o ra l li,s oK∗ is a type-symmetric
entry equilibrium. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .Let Πc
i(K) denote the proﬁts of bidder i from entering if










Now consider the depiction of equilibrium open auction entry in the Figure above.
Collusion by mills has the eﬀect of increasing mill proﬁts for any (KL,K M)p a i r ,
so the curve LM shifts up, while LL stays unchanged. Because LM must still lie
below LL when KM is suﬃciently large, this means that for any open auction entry
equilibrium, there must clearly be a collusive equilibrium with more mill entry, less
logger entry and less chance of a logger winning. Q.E.D.
Appendix II: Omitted Details of the Structural Model.
A. The Likelihood Function
41A useful property of Gamma-Weibull models is that the unobserved heterogeneity
can be integrated out analytically. This leads to the following log-likelihood for
auction t:






































Here θ is the Gamma variance, b1t,...,b(nLt+nMt)t are the observed bids in auction t,
and λit,p it are the Weibull parameters for bidder i in auction t.A s d e ﬁn e di nt h e
text, these are functions of (Xt,N t,n t), the unknown parameter vectors β and γ,a n d
bidder i’s type – logger or mill.
B. Truncating the Bid Distributions
Our independent private values model predicts that the equilibrium bid distribu-
tions will have ﬁnite support. If, for example, there are two bidders of the same type,
b = E[v]. Therefore, modeling the bid distribution as Weibull implicitly imposes an
inﬁnite mean on bidder values. We view this problem as largely technical because it
results from a very small fraction of large bids being rationalized with implausibly
high values. Our solution therefore is to truncate the estimated bid distributions.44
To identify maximum bids at which to truncate, we exploit two facts. First,
truncating the bid distribution does not aﬀect the reverse hazard rate gk/GK,a n d
hence leaves the estimated inverse bid function φ(·), deﬁned in (11), unchanged for
bid values below the truncation. Second, the estimated bid function φ
−1(·)b e c o m e s
very ﬂa tf o rh i g hb i d d e rv a l u e s . T h i sm e a n st h a ti fw eu s eo u rp r i o rk n o w l e d g eo f
timber auctions to specify a plausible maximum value and use the estimated bid
function to locate the implied maximum bid, our resulting truncation point will be
relatively insensitive to the precise maximum value we specify.
To make this operational, we observe that values in our model take the form:
vit =e x p ( XtβX+NtβN)·ξit. We assume that for the “stronger” bidder type in a given
auction (i.e. mills if any are present, otherwise loggers) EXt[exp(XtβX+NtβN)]·ξit ≤
3000, so that for the average tract in our sample, the highest possible value is $3000 per
44An alternative would be to specify directly a bid distribution with ﬁnite support, but this has
s e r i o u sp i t f a l l sa sw e l lb e c a u s ei tr e q u i r e se s t i m ating the maximum bid conditional on observed and
unobserved covariates. This is a hard problem, and moreover the mean of bidder values will be in
close correspondence with the (arguably poor) estimate.
42mbf. This assumption implies an upper bound on the value distribution vt(Xt,u t,N t):




For an auction with a set nt of participants, the bid resulting from this maximum
value, b(Xt,u t,N t,n t), satisﬁes:
φM(b(Xt,u t,N t,n t);Xt,u t,N t,n t)=vk(Xt,u t,N t).
We calculate b(·)n u m e r i c a l l yf o re a c h( Xt,u t,N t,n t) and truncate the bid distribution.
If both mills and loggers participate, this truncation also impose an upper bound on
logger values, one that may be below v(·). In practice, we end up truncating only
a very small fraction of the bid distributio n .I nt h ea u c t i o np l o t t e di nF i g u r e3 ,f o r
instance, less than 1% of mill bids and 0.001% of logger bids are truncated.
A slight concern with our procedure is that the truncation is imposed after we
estimate the bid distribution. One way to view what we do is as the ﬁrst step
of an iterative process where we repeatedly estimate the bid distributions, calculate
b(X,u,N,n), and then re-estimate the bid distributions imposing the new truncation.
Because our one-step procedure leads us to truncate such a small fraction of bids, we
believe that iterating the procedure would lead to extremely similar estimates.
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46Open Auctions Sealed Auctions
Full Sample Selected Full Sample
N 787 658 308 300
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Auction Outcomes
Winning Bid ($/mbf) 70.14 52.94 72.78 53.81 80.21 56.25 81.10 56.57
Entrants 4.12 2.46 4.23 2.45 4.53 2.84 4.57 2.86
  # Loggers Entering 2.62 2.40 2.84 2.39 3.36 2.58 3.42 2.59
  # Mills Entering 1.50 1.65 1.40 1.66 1.17 1.66 1.14 1.66
  Fraction Loggers Entering 0.61 0.39 0.65 0.38 0.76 0.32 0.77 0.32
Logger Wins Auction 0.56 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.67 0.47 0.69 0.46
Appraisal Variables
Volume of timber (hundred mbf) 28.93 39.64 21.95 33.71 15.02 26.97 12.88 22.51
Reserve Price ($/mbf) 26.22 26.72 27.45 27.72 28.46 24.24 28.68 24.38
Selling Value ($/mbf) 196.04 168.41 196.02 169.11 202.59 166.07 201.80 166.66
Road Construction ($/mbf) 6.36 9.84 4.91 9.07 3.11 7.77 2.83 7.54
No Road Construction 0.58 0.49 0.66 0.47 0.78 0.42 0.79 0.41
Logging Costs ($/mbf) 84.66 63.64 82.91 63.77 83.55 62.81 82.51 63.25
Manufacturing Costs ($/mbf) 114.59 84.04 112.93 84.71 117.79 85.57 116.75 86.40
Sale Characteristics
Contract Length (months) 24.78 17.38 22.19 16.35 18.12 14.79 17.03 13.11
Species Herfindal 0.60 0.27 0.59 0.28 0.58 0.27 0.58 0.27
Density of Timber (hmbf/acres) 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07
Salvage Sale 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.49
Scale Sale 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.49
Quarter of Sale 2.39 1.00 2.39 1.01 2.42 1.01 2.42 1.01
Year of Sale 86.08 2.31 86.07 2.38 85.75 2.52 85.76 2.55
Housing Starts 1580.62 237.95 1572.33 235.52 1559.18 261.09 1553.84 261.71
Potential Competition
Logging companies in county 43.86 21.22 42.15 21.67 40.05 22.22 40.36 22.35
Sawmills in County 8.66 4.45 8.42 4.56 7.60 4.47 7.45 4.30
Active Loggers (active in District 
in prior 12 months) 30.97 24.83 30.19 24.22 25.83 17.62 26.19 17.69
Active Manufacturers (active in 
District  in prior 12 months) 11.02 9.01 11.50 9.26 12.33 10.30 12.54 10.34
Selected
Table 1A: Summary Statistics for Northern SalesOpen Auctions Sealed Auctions
Full Sample Selected Full Sample
N 1188 212 694 269
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Auction Outcomes
Winning Bid ($/mbf) 108.62 165.23 118.95 103.51 93.25 71.80 92.09 74.24
Entrants 4.13 2.32 4.23 2.41 3.85 2.59 4.40 2.68
  # Loggers Entering 1.15 1.56 2.12 2.09 2.86 2.25 3.02 2.35
  # Mills Entering 2.98 1.81 2.11 1.90 0.99 1.43 1.38 1.58
  Fraction Loggers Entering 0.24 0.28 0.50 0.37 0.77 0.31 0.70 0.32
Logger Wins Auction 0.17 0.38 0.43 0.50 0.73 0.45 0.62 0.49
Appraisal Variables
Volume of timber (hundred mbf) 63.63 45.60 19.85 20.00 7.39 13.38 10.46 10.36
Reserve Price ($/mbf) 41.96 38.02 49.68 46.54 42.56 39.84 37.32 37.09
Selling Value ($/mbf) 278.86 85.30 246.80 131.93 234.49 268.00 247.68 118.60
Road Construction ($/mbf) 10.66 12.95 4.71 11.44 1.08 4.33 2.04 5.89
No Road Construction 0.26 0.44 0.67 0.47 0.90 0.29 0.83 0.38
Logging Costs ($/mbf) 112.85 40.48 96.24 55.24 89.15 56.32 103.47 52.70
Manufacturing Costs ($/mbf) 127.41 34.47 109.20 54.36 100.97 61.85 114.06 52.95
Sale Characteristics
Contract Length (months) 28.68 14.35 16.37 9.75 10.01 6.62 12.51 6.16
Species Herfindal 0.54 0.23 0.59 0.25 0.60 0.24 0.58 0.24
Density of Timber (hmbf/acres) 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.16 1.82 0.11 0.15
Salvage Sale 0.14 0.35 0.25 0.43 0.36 0.48 0.26 0.44
Scale Sale 0.95 0.21 0.86 0.35 0.67 0.47 0.82 0.38
Quarter of Sale 2.35 1.00 2.55 0.95 2.71 0.88 2.65 0.93
Year of Sale 85.32 2.14 85.62 2.42 85.59 2.30 85.01 2.15
Housing Starts 1587.06 251.78 1528.56 260.22 1558.48 249.87 1581.44 264.07
Potential Competition
Logging companies in county 23.22 18.65 22.32 17.56 20.39 17.35 23.06 19.84
Sawmills in County 6.65 6.50 6.14 5.55 6.05 6.01 7.04 7.73
Active Loggers (active in Forest 
in prior 12 months) 57.65 32.79 60.23 31.55 54.37 30.31 57.96 28.28
Active Manufacturers (active in 
Forest  in prior 12 months) 47.39 27.81 48.96 26.17 44.48 27.08 46.48 26.25
Selected
Table 1B: Summary Statistics for California SalesTable 2: Choice of Sale Method
Dependent Variable: Dummy if auction is sealed bid (Logit regression)
  (1)  (2)
  Northern California
coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e.
Appraisal Controls
Ln(Reserve Price) 0.006 (0.115) 0.192 (0.180)
Ln(Selling Value) -0.049 (0.060) 0.196 (0.593)
Ln(Logging Costs) -0.143 (0.428) 0.302 (0.545)
Ln(Manufacturing Costs) 0.190 (0.426) -0.646 (0.499)
Ln(Road Costs) -0.056 (0.208) -0.025 (0.219)
No Road Construct. (Dummy) 0.455 (0.555) 0.473 (0.565)
Other Sale Characteristics
ln(Contract Length/volume) -0.094 (0.254) 0.005 (0.385)
Species Herfindal -0.735 (0.396) -0.005 (0.473)
Density of Timber (hmbf/acres) -1.645 (1.248) 0.162 (0.324)
Salvage Sale (Dummy) 0.167 (0.183) -0.134 (0.284)
Scale Sale (Dummy) 0.373 (0.195) -1.509 (0.346)
ln(Monthly US House Starts) -1.415 (1.049) -5.965 (1.534)
Volume Controls (Dummy Variables):
Volume: 1.5-3 hundred mbf 0.072 (0.339) -1.394 (0.682)
Volume: 3-5 -0.236 (0.378) -1.611 (0.697)
Volume: 5-8 -0.172 (0.404) -1.790 (0.747)
Volume: 8-12 -0.754 (0.445) -2.902 (0.783)
Volume: 12-20 -0.690 (0.478) -3.632 (0.830)
Volume: 20-40 -1.144 (0.524) -7.229 (0.924)
Volume: 40-65 -1.785 (0.632) -8.615 (1.011)
Volume: 65-90 -1.594 (0.723) -8.320 (1.052)
Volume: 90+ -2.081 (0.705) -10.013 (1.393)
Potential Competition
ln(Loggers in County) -0.276 (0.235) -0.866 (0.329)
ln(Sawmills in County) -0.336 (0.296) 0.355 (0.356)
ln(Active Loggers) -0.058 (0.133) -0.004 (0.291)
ln(Active Manufacturers) -0.084 (0.151) 0.234 (0.339)
Constant 11.979 (7.694) 49.668 (11.012)
Additional Controls (Dummy Variables)
Chi-Squared Statistics (p-value in parenthesis)
Years 6.25 (0.619) 58.30 (0.000)
Quarters 2.08 (0.556) 0.76 (0.860)
Species 12.14 (0.205) 14.58 (0.006)
Location 78.71 (0.000) 144.09 (0.000)
 N=1095 N=1882
LR chi2 (57) 220.11 LR chi2 (50) 1808.59
P-value 0.000 P-value 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.1692 Pseudo-R2 0.7299(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Logger Entry) ln(Mill Entry) Loggers/Entrants Logger Wins ln(Price) ln(Price)
1
Regression with No Interactions Between Sealed and Covariates
2
0.104 -0.017 .056 0.044 0.125 0.076
(0.037)** (0.032) (0.016)*** (0.028) (0.039)*** (0.032)**
Regression with Interactions Between Sealed and All Covariates
0.105 0.004 0.045 0.034 0.139 0.067
(0.037)** (0.033) (0.015)** (0.028) (0.041)*** (0.032)*
0.158 -0.036 0.079 0.074 0.179 0.133
(0.043)*** (0.041) (0.019)*** (0.032)* (0.052)** (0 .048)**
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.
2. See Appendix Tables 1A and 2A for full set of controls and coefficients.
3. Number of matches = 4 using same controls as regression estimates and the estimated propensity score.
Table 3A: Effect of Auction Method on Sale Outcomes (Northern Sales)
(N= 958 Sales)
Sealed Bid Effect
Sealed Bid Effect on Sample




1. Specification includes number of entering mills and loggers in addition to sale controls.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Logger Entry) ln(Mill Entry) Loggers/Entrants Logger Wins ln(Price) ln(Price)
1
Regression with No Interactions Between Sealed and Covariates
2
Sealed Bid Effect 0.131 -0.069 0.087 0.086 0.013 -0.048
(0.058)* (0.051) (0.029)** (0.046)+ (0.065) (0.055)
Includes Interactions Between Sealed and All Covariates
Sealed Bid Effect on Sample 0.120 -0.079 0.084 0.077 0.009 -0.027
(0.058)* (0.050) (0.029)** (0.046)+ (0.064) (0.048)
Sealed Bid Effect on Sample 0.181 -0.194 0.152 0.135 -0.048 -0.027
(0.061)** (0.053)*** (0.031)*** (0.045)** (0.076) (0 .075)
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.





1. Specification includes number of entering mills and loggers in addition to sale controls.
2. See Appendix Tables 1B and 2B for full set of controls and coefficients.
3. Number of matches = 4 using same controls as regression estimates and the estimated propensity score.Table 4A: Bid and Entry Distributions for Sealed Auctions (Northern Sales)
  (1) (2)
  Bid Distribution   Logger Entry  
coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e.
Ln(Reserve Price) 0.42 (0.04) -0.29 (0.05)
Ln(Selling Value) -0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03)
Ln(Manufacturing Costs) 0.44 (0.14) 0.85 (0.17)
Ln(Logging Costs) -0.44 (0.14) -0.81 (0.17)
Ln(Road Costs) 0.00 (0.02) -0.16 (0.04)
Species Herfindal -0.10 (0.11) -0.24 (0.15)
Density of Timber (hmbf/acres) -0.96 (0.31) -0.93 (0.44)
Salvage Sale (Dummy) -0.05 (0.05) -0.02 (0.07)
Scale Sale (Dummy) -0.05 (0.05) -0.15 (0.08)
Ln(Volume) -0.08 (0.03) -0.24 (0.04)
Kootenai NF (Dummy) 0.14 (0.06) 0.18 (0.09)
Mill (Dummy) 0.27 (0.03)
Mill Entrants 0.14 (0.02) 0.09 (0.03)
Mill (Dummy) * Mill Entrants -0.06 (0.07)
Logger Entrants 0.06 (0.02)
Potential Logger Entrants 0.01 (0.00)
Constant 2.71 (0.20) 2.20 (0.26)
Poisson parameter and Weibull scale parameter include year dummies.
Mill(Dummy) 0.01 (0.07)
Mill Entrants 0.06 (0.02)
Mill (Dummy) * Mill Entrants -0.08 (0.12)
Logger Entrants 0.03 (0.02)
Constant 0.94 (0.09)
Constant -0.46 (0.13)
  N=1325 N = 300
 Wald  χ2 (23) 851.8 LR χ2 (21) 199.5
P-value 0.000 P-value 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.14





ln(λ)  (1)  (2)  
  Bid Distribution   Logger Entry  
coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e.
Ln(Reserve Price) 0.59 (0.05) -0.27 (0.06)
Ln(Selling Value) 0.24 (0.13) 0.36 (0.19)
Ln(Manufacturing Costs) -0.10 (0.08) 0.06 (0.13)
Ln(Logging Costs) -0.18 (0.13) -0.46 (0.19)
Ln(Road Costs) 0.03 (0.03) -0.25 (0.06)
Species Herfindal -0.32 (0.11) -0.58 (0.17)
Density of Timber (hmbf/acres) 0.10 (0.16) 0.64 (0.23)
Salvage Sale (Dummy) 0.00 (0.06) -0.08 (0.09)
Scale Sale (Dummy) 0.17 (0.08) 0.42 (0.12)
Ln(Volume) -0.05 (0.04) -0.12 (0.06)
Mill (Dummy) 0.15 (0.03)
Mill Entrants 0.07 (0.02) 0.08 (0.03)
Mill (Dummy) * Mill Entrants -0.09 (0.06)
Logger Entrants 0.10 (0.02)
Potential Logger Entrants 0.01 (0.00)
Constant 1.79 (0.25) 1.81 (0.32)
Poisson parameter and Weibull scale parameter include forest and year dummies.
Mill(Dummy) -0.10 (0.06)
Mill Entrants 0.05 (0.02)
Mill (Dummy) * Mill Entrants 0.07 (0.12)
Logger Entrants -0.02 (0.02)
Constant 1.18 (0.08)
Constant -0.33 (0.13)
  N=1144 N = 269
 Wald  χ2 (28) 1140 LR χ2 (26) 155.8
Prob > chi2 0.000 Prob > chi2 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.13
Note: Bid distribution estimated on sealed bid auctions with two or more bidders (229 auctions).





ln(p)Table 5A: Actual Outcomes vs. Outcomes Predicted by Model (Northern Sales)
  (1)   (2)   (3)
   Predicted  Predicted
N Actual
Avg. Bid 1370 68.5 67.9 (1.9) 67.2 (1.9)
Avg. Logger Bid 1027 57.6 56.6 (1.7) 55.8 (1.6)
Avg. Mill Bid 343 101.0 101.5 (4.2) 101.5 (4.2)
Avg. Sale Price 300 81.1 83.8 (2.5) 85.5 (2.6)
Avg. Revenue 300 116,207 112,392 (5,281) 116,053 (5,782)
% Sales won by Loggers 300 68.7 67.0 (1.2) 64.5 (1.3)
Avg. Logger Entry 300 3.42 3.42 (0.09)
Avg. Sale Price (Competition) 658 72.8 80.7 (2.5) 79.7 (3.6)
Avg. Sale Price (Collusion) 658 72.8 53.0 (1.5) 51.7 (2.6)
Avg. Revenue (Competition) 658 156,937 165,039 (8,758) 166,016 (9,375)
Avg. Revenue (Collusion) 658 156,937 63,507 (1,521) 66,627 (3,159)
% Sales won by Loggers 658 60.0 55.2 (1.2) 53.0 (2.4)
Avg. Logger Entry 658 2.84 2.89 (0.16)
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
Sealed Bid Sales
Open Auction Sales
(bidding only) (entry + bidding)Table 5B: Actual Outcomes vs. Outcomes Predicted by Model (California Sales)
  (1)   (2)   (3)
   Predicted  Predicted
N Actual
Avg. Bid 1184 80.8 82.7 (4.1) 80.7 (3.6)
Avg. Logger Bid 812 68.2 68.1 (3.7) 65.2 (3.2)
Avg. Mill Bid 372 108.3 114.6 (5.7) 114.6 (5.7)
Avg. Sale Price 269 92.1 97.8 (4.0) 98.7 (4.7)
Avg. Revenue 269 107,354 116,682 (5,572) 118,887 (6,156)
% Sales won by Loggers 269 62.1 62.1 (1.7) 60.2 (1.8)
Avg. Logger Entry 269 3.02 3.02 (0.13)
Avg. Sale Price (Competition) 212 119.0 120.7 (5.7) 115.1 (8.7)
Avg. Sale Price (Collusion) 212 119.0 65.8 (2.8) 63.5 (4.0)
Avg. Revenue (Competition) 212 269,511 294,775 (18,923) 281,958 (23,285)
Avg. Revenue (Collusion) 212 269,511 111,860 (4,319) 123,397 (6,453)
% Sales won by Loggers 212 42.9 42.9 (1.8) 39.0 (4.7)
Avg. Logger Entry 212 2.12 1.87 (0.26)
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
Sealed Bid Sales
Open Auction Sales
(bidding only) (entry + bidding)Table 6A: Welfare Effects of Sealed vs. Open Auctions (Northern Sales)
(1) (2)   (4)  
Sealed Bid Open Auction Open Auction
(Competitive) (Part. Collusion)
Avg. Sale Price 82.0 81.5 0.5 (0.1) 75.1 6.9 (0.4)
Avg. Sale Revenue 149,045 148,394 651 (141) 126,613 22,432 (1,752)
Avg. Sale Surplus 251,908 252,008 -100 (42.7) 252,008 -100 (42.7)
% Sales Won by Loggers 59.4 58.7 0.7 (0.2) 58.7 0.7 (0.2)
Avg. Sale Price 83.5 80.9 2.6 (3.1) 74.2 9.3 (3.0)
Avg. Sale Revenue 154,302 148,959 5,343 (5,582) 127,272 27,030 (5,582)
Avg. Sale Surplus 256,382 253,580 2,803 (9,900) 253,580 2,803 (9,900)
% Sales Won by Loggers 58.7 56.0 2.6 (2.6) 56.0 2.6 (2.6)
Logger Entry 3.28 2.98 0.30 (0.23) 2.98 0.30 (0.28)




Predict Entry & Bidding
(3)
DifferenceTable 6B: Welfare Effects of Sealed vs. Open Auctions (California)
(1) (2)   (4)  
Sealed Bid Open Auction Open Auction
(Competitive) est. s.e. (Part. Collusion) est. s.e.
Avg. Sale Price 108.2 107.5 0.6 (0.1) 97.2 11.0 (0.8)
Avg. Sale Revenue 195,833 194,815 1,018 (119) 166,964 28,869 (2,299)
Avg. Sale Surplus 289,776 289,821 -45 (23.3) 289,821 -45 (23.3)
% Sales Won by Loggers 53.9 53.3 0.5 (0.2) 53.3 0.5 (0.2)
Avg. Sale Price 112.7 101.4 11.3 (6.7) 91.6 21.1 (6.2)
Avg. Sale Revenue 210,269 184,026 26,243 (12,821) 159,796 50,474 (11,872)
Avg. Sale Surplus 304,145 274,116 30,029 (52,426) 274,116 30,029 (52,426)
% Sales Won by Loggers 53.2 48.9 4.3 (4.5) 48.9 4.3 (4.5)
Logger Entry 2.84 2.26 0.58 (0.3) 2.26 0.58 (0.3)




Predict Entry & Bidding
(3)
DifferenceFigure 1A 
Density of Propensity Score by Auction Format for Idaho and Montana Sales— 
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Actual Bid Density Estimated Bid Density  Figure 3A: Estimated Value Distributions and Bid Functions




















































Figure 3B: Estimated Value Distributions and Bid Functions 













































Logger Bid Function Mill Bid Function Logger Value Density Mill Value Density
 NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series
Our Note di Lavoro are available on the Internet at the following addresses:
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.html
http://www.ssrn.com/link/feem.html
NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2003
PRIV 1.2003 Gabriella CHIESA and Giovanna NICODANO: Privatization and Financial Market Development: Theoretical
Issues
PRIV 2.2003 Ibolya SCHINDELE: Theory of Privatization in Eastern Europe: Literature Review
PRIV 3.2003 Wietze LISE, Claudia KEMFERT and Richard S.J. TOL: Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity
Market
CLIM 4.2003 Laura MARSILIANI and Thomas I. RENSTRÖM: Environmental Policy and Capital Movements: The Role of
Government Commitment
KNOW 5.2003 Reyer GERLAGH: Induced Technological Change under Technological Competition
ETA 6.2003 Efrem CASTELNUOVO: Squeezing the Interest Rate Smoothing Weight with a Hybrid Expectations Model
SIEV 7.2003 Anna ALBERINI, Alberto LONGO, Stefania TONIN, Francesco TROMBETTA and Margherita TURVANI: The
Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment:
Evidence from Surveys of Developers
NRM 8.2003 Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Natural Resources: A Blessing or a Curse?
CLIM 9.2003 A. CAPARRÓS, J.-C. PEREAU and T. TAZDAÏT: North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game
with Asymmetric Information
KNOW 10.2003 Giorgio BRUNELLO and Daniele CHECCHI: School Quality and Family Background in Italy
CLIM 11.2003 Efrem CASTELNUOVO and Marzio GALEOTTI: Learning By Doing vs Learning By Researching in a Model of
Climate Change Policy Analysis
KNOW 12.2003 Carole MAIGNAN, Gianmarco OTTAVIANO and Dino PINELLI (eds.): Economic Growth, Innovation, Cultural
Diversity: What are we all talking about? A critical survey of the state-of-the-art
KNOW 13.2003 Carole MAIGNAN, Gianmarco OTTAVIANO, Dino PINELLI and Francesco RULLANI (lix): Bio-Ecological
Diversity vs. Socio-Economic Diversity. A Comparison of Existing Measures
KNOW 14.2003 Maddy JANSSENS and Chris STEYAERT (lix): Theories of Diversity within Organisation Studies: Debates and
Future Trajectories
KNOW 15.2003 Tuzin BAYCAN LEVENT, Enno MASUREL and Peter NIJKAMP (lix): Diversity in Entrepreneurship: Ethnic and
Female Roles in Urban Economic Life
KNOW 16.2003 Alexandra BITUSIKOVA (lix): Post-Communist City on its Way from Grey to Colourful: The Case Study from
Slovakia
KNOW 17.2003 Billy E. VAUGHN and Katarina MLEKOV (lix): A Stage Model of Developing an Inclusive Community




19.2003 Sergio CURRARINI: On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities
PRIV 20.2003 Giacomo CALZOLARI and Alessandro PAVAN (lx): Monopoly with Resale
PRIV 21.2003 Claudio MEZZETTI (lx): Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation
Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition
PRIV 22.2003 Marco LiCalzi and Alessandro PAVAN (lx): Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-
Price Auctions
PRIV 23.2003 David ETTINGER (lx): Bidding among Friends and Enemies
PRIV 24.2003 Hannu VARTIAINEN (lx): Auction Design without Commitment
PRIV 25.2003 Matti KELOHARJU, Kjell G. NYBORG and Kristian RYDQVIST (lx): Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in
Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions
PRIV 26.2003 Christine A. PARLOUR and Uday RAJAN (lx): Rationing in IPOs
PRIV 27.2003 Kjell G. NYBORG and Ilya A. STREBULAEV (lx): Multiple Unit Auctions and Short Squeezes
PRIV 28.2003 Anders LUNANDER and Jan-Eric NILSSON (lx): Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative
Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts
PRIV 29.2003 TangaMcDANIEL and Karsten NEUHOFF (lx): Use of Long-term Auctions for Network Investment
PRIV 30.2003 Emiel MAASLAND and Sander ONDERSTAL (lx): Auctions with Financial Externalities
ETA 31.2003 Michael FINUS and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN: A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive
Externality NTU-Coalition Games
KNOW 32.2003 Michele MORETTO: Competition and Irreversible Investments under Uncertainty_
PRIV 33.2003 Philippe QUIRION: Relative Quotas: Correct Answer to Uncertainty or Case of Regulatory Capture?
KNOW 34.2003 Giuseppe MEDA, Claudio PIGA and Donald SIEGEL: On the Relationship between R&D and Productivity: A
Treatment Effect Analysis
ETA 35.2003 Alessandra DEL BOCA, Marzio GALEOTTI and Paola ROTA: Non-convexities in the Adjustment of Different
Capital Inputs: A Firm-level InvestigationGG 36.2003 Matthieu GLACHANT: Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats
PRIV 37.2003 Narjess BOUBAKRI, Jean-Claude COSSET and Omrane GUEDHAMI: Postprivatization Corporate Governance:
the Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection
CLIM 38.2003 Rolf GOLOMBEK and Michael HOEL: Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers
KNOW 39.2003 Slim BEN YOUSSEF: Transboundary Pollution, R&D Spillovers and International Trade
CTN 40.2003 Carlo CARRARO and Carmen MARCHIORI: Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations
KNOW 41.2003 Sonia OREFFICE: Abortion and Female Power in the Household: Evidence from Labor Supply
KNOW 42.2003 Timo GOESCHL and Timothy SWANSON: On Biology and Technology: The Economics of Managing
Biotechnologies
ETA 43.2003 Giorgio BUSETTI and Matteo MANERA: STAR-GARCH Models for Stock Market Interactions in the Pacific
Basin Region, Japan and US
CLIM 44.2003 Katrin MILLOCK and Céline NAUGES: The French Tax on Air Pollution: Some Preliminary Results on its
Effectiveness
PRIV 45.2003 Bernardo BORTOLOTTI and Paolo PINOTTI: The Political Economy of Privatization
SIEV 46.2003 Elbert DIJKGRAAF and Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: Burn or Bury? A Social Cost Comparison of Final Waste
Disposal Methods
ETA 47.2003 Jens HORBACH: Employment and Innovations in the Environmental Sector: Determinants and Econometrical
Results for Germany
CLIM 48.2003 Lori SNYDER, Nolan MILLER and Robert STAVINS: The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Technology
Diffusion: The Case of Chlorine Manufacturing
CLIM 49.2003 Lori SNYDER, Robert STAVINS and Alexander F. WAGNER: Private Options to Use Public Goods. Exploiting
Revealed Preferences to Estimate Environmental Benefits
CTN 50.2003 László Á. KÓCZY and Luc LAUWERS (lxi): The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension
CTN 51.2003 Matthew O. JACKSON (lxi):Allocation Rules for Network Games
CTN 52.2003 Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH (lxi): Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation
CTN 53.2003 Fernando VEGA-REDONDO (lxi): Building Up Social Capital in a Changing World: a network approach
CTN 54.2003 Matthew HAAG and Roger LAGUNOFF (lxi): On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation
CTN 55.2003 Taiji FURUSAWA and Hideo KONISHI (lxi): Free Trade Networks
CTN 56.2003 Halis Murat YILDIZ (lxi): National Versus International Mergers and Trade Liberalization
CTN 57.2003 Santiago RUBIO and Alistair ULPH (lxi): An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International
Environmental Agreements
KNOW 58.2003 Carole MAIGNAN, Dino PINELLI and Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO: ICT, Clusters and Regional Cohesion: A
Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Research
KNOW 59.2003 Giorgio BELLETTINI and Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO: Special Interests and Technological Change
ETA 60.2003 Ronnie SCHÖB: The Double Dividend Hypothesis of Environmental Taxes: A Survey
CLIM 61.2003 Michael FINUS, Ekko van IERLAND and Robert DELLINK: Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel
Formation Game
GG 62.2003 Michael FINUS and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN: How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of
International Environmental Agreements
SIEV 63.2003 Alberto PETRUCCI: Taxing Land Rent in an Open Economy
CLIM 64.2003 Joseph E. ALDY, Scott BARRETT and Robert N. STAVINS: Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate
Policy Architectures
SIEV 65.2003 Edi DEFRANCESCO: The Beginning of Organic Fish Farming in Italy
SIEV 66.2003 Klaus CONRAD: Price Competition and Product Differentiation when Consumers Care for the Environment
SIEV 67.2003 Paulo A.L.D. NUNES, Luca ROSSETTO, Arianne DE BLAEIJ: Monetary Value Assessment of Clam Fishing
Management Practices in the Venice Lagoon: Results from a Stated Choice Exercise
CLIM 68.2003 ZhongXiang ZHANG: Open Trade with the U.S. Without Compromising Canada’s Ability to Comply with its
Kyoto Target
KNOW 69.2003 David FRANTZ (lix): Lorenzo Market between Diversity and Mutation
KNOW 70.2003 Ercole SORI (lix): Mapping Diversity in Social History
KNOW 71.2003 Ljiljana DERU SIMIC (lxii): What is Specific about Art/Cultural Projects?
KNOW 72.2003 Natalya V. TARANOVA (lxii):The Role of the City in Fostering Intergroup Communication in a Multicultural
Environment: Saint-Petersburg’s Case
KNOW 73.2003 Kristine CRANE (lxii): The City as an Arena for the Expression of Multiple Identities in the Age of
Globalisation and Migration
KNOW 74.2003 Kazuma MATOBA (lxii): Glocal Dialogue- Transformation through Transcultural Communication
KNOW 75.2003 Catarina REIS OLIVEIRA (lxii): Immigrants’ Entrepreneurial Opportunities: The Case of the Chinese in
Portugal
KNOW 76.2003 Sandra WALLMAN (lxii): The Diversity of Diversity - towards a typology of urban systems
KNOW 77.2003 Richard PEARCE (lxii): A Biologist’s View of Individual Cultural Identity for the Study of Cities
KNOW 78.2003 Vincent MERK (lxii): Communication Across Cultures: from Cultural Awareness to Reconciliation of the
Dilemmas
KNOW 79.2003 Giorgio BELLETTINI, Carlotta BERTI CERONI and Gianmarco I.P.OTTAVIANO: Child Labor and Resistance
to Change
ETA 80.2003 Michele MORETTO, Paolo M. PANTEGHINI and Carlo SCARPA: Investment Size and Firm’s Value under
Profit Sharing RegulationIEM 81.2003 Alessandro LANZA, Matteo MANERA and Massimo GIOVANNINI: Oil and Product Dynamics in International
Petroleum Markets
CLIM 82.2003 Y. Hossein FARZIN and Jinhua ZHAO: Pollution Abatement Investment When Firms Lobby Against
Environmental Regulation
CLIM 83.2003 Giuseppe DI VITA: Is the Discount Rate Relevant in Explaining the Environmental Kuznets Curve?
CLIM 84.2003 Reyer GERLAGH and Wietze LISE: Induced Technological Change Under Carbon Taxes
NRM 85.2003 Rinaldo BRAU, Alessandro LANZA and Francesco PIGLIARU: How Fast are the Tourism Countries Growing?
The cross-country evidence
KNOW 86.2003 Elena BELLINI, Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Dino PINELLI: The ICT Revolution: opportunities and risks
for the Mezzogiorno
SIEV 87.2003 Lucas BRETSCGHER and Sjak SMULDERS: Sustainability and Substitution of Exhaustible Natural Resources.
How resource prices affect long-term R&D investments
CLIM 88.2003 Johan EYCKMANS and Michael FINUS: New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of
Global Warming
CLIM 89.2003 Marzio GALEOTTI: Economic Development and Environmental Protection
CLIM 90.2003 Marzio GALEOTTI: Environment and Economic Growth: Is Technical Change the Key to Decoupling?
CLIM 91.2003 Marzio GALEOTTI and Barbara BUCHNER: Climate Policy and Economic Growth in Developing Countries
IEM 92.2003 A. MARKANDYA, A. GOLUB and E. STRUKOVA: The Influence of Climate Change Considerations on Energy
Policy: The Case of Russia
ETA 93.2003 Andrea BELTRATTI: Socially Responsible Investment in General Equilibrium
CTN 94.2003 Parkash CHANDER: The γ-Core and Coalition Formation
IEM 95.2003 Matteo MANERA and Angelo MARZULLO: Modelling the Load Curve of Aggregate Electricity Consumption
Using Principal Components
IEM 96.2003 Alessandro LANZA, Matteo MANERA, Margherita GRASSO and Massimo GIOVANNINI: Long-run Models of
Oil Stock Prices
CTN 97.2003 Steven J. BRAMS, Michael A.  JONES, and D. Marc KILGOUR: Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process
Matters
KNOW 98.2003 John CROWLEY, Marie-Cecile NAVES (lxiii): Anti-Racist Policies in France. From Ideological and Historical
Schemes to Socio-Political Realities
KNOW 99.2003 Richard THOMPSON FORD (lxiii): Cultural Rights and Civic Virtue
KNOW 100.2003 Alaknanda PATEL (lxiii): Cultural Diversity and Conflict in Multicultural Cities
KNOW 101.2003 David MAY (lxiii): The Struggle of Becoming Established in a Deprived Inner-City Neighbourhood
KNOW 102.2003 Sébastien ARCAND, Danielle JUTEAU, Sirma BILGE, and Francine LEMIRE (lxiii) : Municipal Reform on the
Island of Montreal: Tensions Between Two Majority Groups in a Multicultural City
CLIM 103.2003 Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: China and the Evolution of the Present Climate Regime
CLIM 104.2003 Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in
International Climate Agreements
CLIM 105.2003 Anil MARKANDYA and Dirk T.G. RÜBBELKE: Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy
NRM 106.2003 Anne Sophie CRÉPIN (lxiv): Management Challenges for Multiple-Species Boreal Forests
NRM 107.2003 Anne Sophie CRÉPIN (lxiv): Threshold Effects in Coral Reef  Fisheries
SIEV 108.2003 Sara ANIYAR ( lxiv): Estimating the Value of Oil Capital in a Small Open Economy: The Venezuela’s Example
SIEV 109.2003 Kenneth ARROW, Partha DASGUPTA and Karl-Göran MÄLER(lxiv): Evaluating Projects and Assessing
Sustainable Development in Imperfect Economies
NRM 110.2003 Anastasios XEPAPADEAS and Catarina ROSETA-PALMA(lxiv): Instabilities and Robust Control in  Fisheries
NRM 111.2003 Charles PERRINGS and Brian WALKER (lxiv): Conservation and Optimal Use of Rangelands
ETA 112.2003 Jack GOODY (lxiv): Globalisation, Population and Ecology
CTN 113.2003 Carlo CARRARO, Carmen MARCHIORI and Sonia OREFFICE: Endogenous Minimum Participation in
International Environmental Treaties
CTN 114.2003 Guillaume HAERINGER and Myrna WOODERS: Decentralized Job Matching
CTN 115.2003 Hideo KONISHI and M. Utku UNVER: Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems
CTN 116.2003 Somdeb LAHIRI: Stable Matchings for the Room-Mates Problem
CTN 117.2003 Somdeb LAHIRI: Stable Matchings for a Generalized Marriage Problem
CTN 118.2003 Marita LAUKKANEN: Transboundary Fisheries Management under Implementation Uncertainty
CTN 119.2003 Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary
Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results
CTN 120.2003 Gianluigi VERNASCA: Dynamic Price Competition with Price Adjustment Costs and Product Differentiation
CTN 121.2003 Myrna WOODERS, Edward CARTWRIGHT and Reinhard SELTEN: Social Conformity in Games with Many
Players
CTN 122.2003 Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players
CTN 123.2003 Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many
Players
1000 Carlo CARRARO, Alessandro LANZA and Valeria PAPPONETTI: One Thousand Working PapersNOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2004
IEM 1.2004 Anil MARKANDYA, Suzette PEDROSO and Alexander GOLUB:  Empirical Analysis of National Income and
So2 Emissions in Selected European Countries
ETA 2.2004 Masahisa FUJITA and Shlomo WEBER: Strategic Immigration Policies and Welfare in Heterogeneous Countries
PRA 3.2004 Adolfo DI CARLUCCIO, Giovanni FERRI, Cecilia FRALE and Ottavio RICCHI: Do Privatizations Boost
Household Shareholding? Evidence from Italy
ETA 4.2004 Victor GINSBURGH and Shlomo WEBER: Languages Disenfranchisement in the European Union
ETA 5.2004 Romano PIRAS: Growth, Congestion of Public Goods, and Second-Best Optimal Policy
CCMP 6.2004 Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: Lessons from the Polder: Is Dutch CO2-Taxation Optimal
PRA 7.2004 Sandro BRUSCO, Giuseppe LOPOMO and S. VISWANATHAN (lxv): Merger Mechanisms
PRA 8.2004 Wolfgang AUSSENEGG, Pegaret PICHLER and Alex STOMPER (lxv): IPO Pricing with Bookbuilding, and a
When-Issued Market
PRA 9.2004 Pegaret PICHLER and Alex STOMPER (lxv): Primary Market Design: Direct Mechanisms and Markets
PRA 10.2004 Florian ENGLMAIER, Pablo GUILLEN, Loreto LLORENTE, Sander ONDERSTAL and Rupert SAUSGRUBER
(lxv): The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions
PRA 11.2004 Bjarne BRENDSTRUP and Harry J. PAARSCH (lxv): Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-
Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders
PRA 12.2004 Ohad KADAN (lxv): Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliated Private Values
PRA 13.2004 Maarten C.W. JANSSEN (lxv): Auctions as Coordination Devices
PRA 14.2004 Gadi FIBICH, Arieh GAVIOUS and Aner SELA (lxv): All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers
PRA 15.2004 Orly SADE, Charles SCHNITZLEIN and Jaime F. ZENDER (lxv): Competition and Cooperation in Divisible
Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination
PRA 16.2004 Marta STRYSZOWSKA (lxv): Late and Multiple Bidding in Competing Second Price Internet Auctions
CCMP 17.2004 Slim Ben YOUSSEF: R&D in Cleaner Technology and International Trade
NRM 18.2004 Angelo ANTOCI, Simone BORGHESI and Paolo RUSSU (lxvi): Biodiversity and Economic Growth:
Stabilization Versus Preservation of the Ecological Dynamhcs
SIEV 19.2004 Anna ALBERINI, Paolo ROSATO, Alberto LONGO  and Valentina ZANATTA: Information and Willingness to
Pay in a Contingent Valuation Study: The Value of S. Erasmo in the Lagoon of Venice
NRM 20.2004 Guido CANDELA and Roberto CELLINI (lxvii): Investment in Tourism Market: A Dynamic Model of
Differentiated Oligopoly
NRM 21.2004 Jacqueline M. HAMILTON (lxvii): Climate and the Destination Choice of German Tourists
NRM 22.2004 Javier Rey-MAQUIEIRA PALMER, Javier LOZANO IBÁÑEZ  and Carlos Mario GÓMEZ GÓMEZ (lxvii):
Land, Environmental Externalities and Tourism Development
NRM 23.2004 Pius ODUNGA and Henk FOLMER (lxvii): Profiling Tourists for Balanced Utilization of Tourism-Based
Resources in Kenya
NRM 24.2004 Jean-Jacques NOWAK, Mondher SAHLI and Pasquale M. SGRO (lxvii):Tourism, Trade and Domestic Welfare
NRM 25.2004 Riaz SHAREEF (lxvii): Country Risk Ratings of Small Island Tourism Economies
NRM 26.2004 Juan Luis EUGENIO-MARTÍN, Noelia MARTÍN MORALES and Riccardo SCARPA (lxvii): Tourism and
Economic Growth in Latin American Countries: A Panel Data Approach
NRM 27.2004 Raúl Hernández MARTÍN (lxvii): Impact of Tourism Consumption on GDP. The Role of Imports
CSRM 28.2004 Nicoletta FERRO: Cross-Country Ethical Dilemmas in Business: A Descriptive Framework
NRM 29.2004 Marian WEBER (lxvi): Assessing the Effectiveness of Tradable Landuse Rights for Biodiversity Conservation:
an Application to Canada's Boreal Mixedwood Forest
NRM 30.2004 Trond BJORNDAL, Phoebe KOUNDOURI and Sean PASCOE (lxvi): Output Substitution in Multi-Species
Trawl Fisheries: Implications for Quota Setting
CCMP 31.2004 Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandra GORIA, Paolo MOMBRINI and Evi SPANTIDAKI: Weather Impacts on
Natural, Social and Economic Systems (WISE) Part I: Sectoral Analysis of Climate Impacts in Italy
CCMP 32.2004 Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandra GORIA ,Paolo MOMBRINI and Evi SPANTIDAKI: Weather Impacts on
Natural, Social and Economic Systems (WISE) Part II: Individual Perception of Climate Extremes in Italy
CTN 33.2004 Wilson PEREZ: Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution
KTHC 34.2004 Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Giovanni PERI (lxviii): The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence
from US Cities
KTHC 35.2004 Linda CHAIB (lxviii): Immigration and Local Urban Participatory Democracy: A Boston-Paris Comparison
KTHC 36.2004 Franca ECKERT COEN and Claudio ROSSI  (lxviii): Foreigners, Immigrants, Host Cities: The Policies of
Multi-Ethnicity in Rome. Reading Governance in a Local Context
KTHC 37.2004 Kristine CRANE (lxviii): Governing Migration: Immigrant Groups’ Strategies in Three Italian Cities – Rome,
Naples and Bari
KTHC 38.2004 Kiflemariam HAMDE (lxviii): Mind in Africa, Body in Europe: The Struggle for Maintaining and Transforming
Cultural Identity - A Note from the Experience of Eritrean Immigrants in Stockholm
ETA 39.2004 Alberto CAVALIERE: Price Competition with Information Disparities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
PRA 40.2004 Andrea BIGANO and Stef PROOST: The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental
Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter?
CCMP 41.2004 Micheal FINUS (lxix): International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems
KTHC 42.2004 Francesco CRESPI: Notes on the Determinants of Innovation: A Multi-Perspective AnalysisCTN 43.2004 Sergio CURRARINI and Marco MARINI: Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies
CTN 44.2004 Marc ESCRIHUELA-VILLAR: Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability
NRM 45.2004 Sebastian BERVOETS and Nicolas GRAVEL (lxvi): Appraising Diversity with an Ordinal Notion of Similarity:
An Axiomatic Approach
NRM 46.2004 Signe ANTHON and Bo JELLESMARK THORSEN (lxvi):  Optimal Afforestation Contracts with Asymmetric
Information on Private Environmental Benefits
NRM 47.2004 John MBURU (lxvi): Wildlife Conservation and Management in Kenya: Towards a Co-management Approach
NRM 48.2004 Ekin BIROL, Ágnes GYOVAI  and Melinda SMALE (lxvi): Using a Choice Experiment to Value Agricultural
Biodiversity on Hungarian Small Farms: Agri-Environmental Policies in a Transition al Economy
CCMP 49.2004 Gernot KLEPPER and Sonja PETERSON: The EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Allowance Prices, Trade Flows,
Competitiveness Effects
GG 50.2004 Scott BARRETT and Michael HOEL: Optimal Disease Eradication
CTN 51.2004 Dinko DIMITROV, Peter BORM, Ruud HENDRICKX and Shao CHIN SUNG: Simple Priorities and Core
Stability in Hedonic Games
SIEV 52.2004 Francesco RICCI: Channels of Transmission of Environmental Policy to Economic Growth: A Survey of the
Theory
SIEV 53.2004 Anna ALBERINI, Maureen CROPPER, Alan KRUPNICK and Nathalie B. SIMON: Willingness to Pay for
Mortality Risk Reductions: Does Latency Matter?
NRM 54.2004 Ingo BRÄUER and Rainer MARGGRAF (lxvi): Valuation of Ecosystem Services Provided by Biodiversity
Conservation: An Integrated Hydrological and Economic Model to Value the Enhanced Nitrogen Retention in
Renaturated Streams
NRM 55.2004 Timo GOESCHL and  Tun LIN (lxvi): Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and
Regulatory Choices
NRM 56.2004 Tom DEDEURWAERDERE (lxvi): Bioprospection: From the Economics of Contracts to Reflexive Governance
CCMP 57.2004 Katrin REHDANZ  and David MADDISON: The Amenity Value of Climate to German Households
CCMP 58.2004 Koen SMEKENS and Bob VAN DER ZWAAN: Environmental Externalities of Geological Carbon Sequestration
Effects on Energy Scenarios
NRM 59.2004 Valentina BOSETTI, Mariaester CASSINELLI and Alessandro LANZA (lxvii): Using Data Envelopment
Analysis to Evaluate Environmentally Conscious Tourism Management
NRM 60.2004 Timo GOESCHL and Danilo CAMARGO IGLIORI (lxvi):Property Rights Conservation and Development: An
Analysis of Extractive Reserves in the Brazilian Amazon
CCMP 61.2004 Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a
Technology-based Climate Protocol
NRM 62.2004 Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Resource-Abundance and Economic Growth in the U.S.
NRM 63.2004 Györgyi BELA, György PATAKI, Melinda SMALE and Mariann HAJDÚ (lxvi): Conserving Crop Genetic
Resources on Smallholder Farms in Hungary: Institutional Analysis
NRM 64.2004 E.C.M. RUIJGROK and E.E.M. NILLESEN (lxvi): The Socio-Economic Value of Natural Riverbanks in the
Netherlands
NRM 65.2004 E.C.M. RUIJGROK (lxvi): Reducing Acidification: The Benefits of Increased Nature Quality. Investigating the
Possibilities of the Contingent Valuation Method
ETA 66.2004 Giannis VARDAS and Anastasios XEPAPADEAS: Uncertainty Aversion, Robust Control and Asset Holdings
GG 67.2004 Anastasios XEPAPADEAS and Constadina PASSA: Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary
Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach
GG 68.2004 Michael FINUS: Modesty Pays: Sometimes!
NRM 69.2004 Trond BJØRNDAL and Ana BRASÃO: The Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries: Management and Policy
Implications
CTN 70.2004 Alejandro CAPARRÓS, Abdelhakim HAMMOUDI and Tarik TAZDAÏT: On Coalition Formation with
Heterogeneous Agents
IEM 71.2004 Massimo GIOVANNINI, Margherita GRASSO, Alessandro LANZA and Matteo MANERA: Conditional
Correlations in the Returns on Oil Companies Stock Prices and Their Determinants
IEM 72.2004 Alessandro LANZA,  Matteo MANERA and Michael MCALEER: Modelling Dynamic Conditional Correlations
in WTI Oil Forward and Futures Returns
SIEV 73.2004 Margarita GENIUS and Elisabetta STRAZZERA: The Copula Approach to Sample Selection Modelling:
An Application to the Recreational Value of Forests
CCMP 74.2004 Rob DELLINK and Ekko van IERLAND: Pollution Abatement in the Netherlands: A Dynamic Applied General
Equilibrium Assessment
ETA 75.2004 Rosella LEVAGGI and Michele MORETTO: Investment in Hospital Care Technology under Different
Purchasing Rules: A Real Option Approach
CTN 76.2004 Salvador BARBERÀ and Matthew O. JACKSON (lxx): On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in
a Heterogeneous Union
CTN 77.2004 Àlex ARENAS, Antonio CABRALES, Albert DÍAZ-GUILERA, Roger GUIMERÀ and Fernando VEGA-
REDONDO (lxx): Optimal Information Transmission in Organizations: Search and Congestion
CTN 78.2004 Francis BLOCH and Armando GOMES (lxx): Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options
CTN 79.2004 Rabah AMIR, Effrosyni DIAMANTOUDI and Licun XUE (lxx): Merger Performance under Uncertain Efficiency
Gains
CTN 80.2004 Francis BLOCH and Matthew O. JACKSON (lxx): The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players
CTN 81.2004 Daniel DIERMEIER, Hülya ERASLAN and Antonio MERLO (lxx): Bicameralism and Government FormationCTN 82.2004 Rod GARRATT, James E. PARCO, Cheng-ZHONG QIN and Amnon RAPOPORT (lxx): Potential Maximization
and Coalition Government Formation
CTN 83.2004 Kfir ELIAZ, Debraj RAY and Ronny RAZIN (lxx): Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement
CTN 84.2004 Sanjeev GOYAL, Marco van der LEIJ and José Luis MORAGA-GONZÁLEZ (lxx): Economics: An Emerging
Small World?
CTN 85.2004 Edward CARTWRIGHT (lxx): Learning to Play Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games with Many Players
IEM 86.2004 Finn R. FØRSUND and Michael HOEL: Properties of a Non-Competitive Electricity Market Dominated by
Hydroelectric Power
KTHC 87.2004 Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Natural Resources, Investment and Long-Term Income
CCMP 88.2004 Marzio GALEOTTI and Claudia KEMFERT: Interactions between Climate and Trade Policies: A Survey
IEM 89.2004 A. MARKANDYA, S. PEDROSO  and D. STREIMIKIENE: Energy Efficiency in Transition Economies: Is There
Convergence Towards the EU Average?
GG 90.2004 Rolf GOLOMBEK and Michael HOEL : Climate Agreements and Technology Policy
PRA 91.2004 Sergei IZMALKOV (lxv): Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction
KTHC 92.2004 Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Giovanni PERI: Cities and Cultures
KTHC 93.2004 Massimo DEL GATTO:  Agglomeration, Integration, and Territorial Authority Scale in a System of Trading
Cities. Centralisation versus devolution
CCMP 94.2004 Pierre-André JOUVET, Philippe MICHEL and Gilles ROTILLON: Equilibrium with a Market of Permits
CCMP 95.2004 Bob van der ZWAAN  and Reyer GERLAGH: Climate Uncertainty and the Necessity to Transform Global
Energy Supply
CCMP 96.2004 Francesco BOSELLO, Marco LAZZARIN, Roberto ROSON and Richard S.J. TOL: Economy-Wide Estimates of
the Implications of Climate Change: Sea Level Rise
CTN 97.2004 Gustavo BERGANTIÑOS and  Juan J. VIDAL-PUGA: Defining Rules in Cost Spanning Tree Problems Through
the Canonical Form
CTN 98.2004 Siddhartha BANDYOPADHYAY and Mandar OAK: Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of
Proportional Representation
GG 99.2004 Hans-Peter WEIKARD, Michael FINUS and Juan-Carlos ALTAMIRANO-CABRERA: The Impact of Surplus
Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Agreements
SIEV 100.2004 Chiara M. TRAVISI and Peter NIJKAMP: Willingness to Pay for Agricultural Environmental Safety: Evidence
from a Survey of Milan, Italy, Residents
SIEV 101.2004 Chiara M. TRAVISI, Raymond J. G. M. FLORAX and Peter NIJKAMP:
 A Meta-Analysis of the Willingness to
Pay for Reductions in Pesticide Risk Exposure
NRM 102.2004 Valentina BOSETTI and David TOMBERLIN: Real Options Analysis of Fishing Fleet Dynamics: A Test
CCMP 103.2004 Alessandra GORIA e Gretel GAMBARELLI: Economic Evaluation of Climate Change Impacts and Adaptability
in Italy
PRA 104.2004 Massimo FLORIO and Mara GRASSENI: The Missing Shock: The Macroeconomic Impact of British
Privatisation
PRA 105.2004 John BENNETT, Saul ESTRIN, James MAW and Giovanni URGA: Privatisation Methods and Economic Growth
in Transition Economies
PRA 106.2004 Kira BÖRNER: The Political Economy of Privatization: Why Do Governments Want Reforms?
PRA 107.2004 Pehr-Johan NORBÄCK and Lars PERSSON: Privatization and Restructuring in Concentrated Markets
SIEV 108.2004 Angela GRANZOTTO, Fabio PRANOVI, Simone LIBRALATO, Patrizia TORRICELLI and Danilo
MAINARDI: Comparison between Artisanal Fishery and Manila Clam Harvesting in the Venice Lagoon by
Using Ecosystem Indicators: An Ecological Economics Perspective
CTN 109.2004 Somdeb LAHIRI:  The Cooperative Theory of Two Sided Matching Problems: A Re-examination of  Some
Results
NRM 110.2004 Giuseppe DI VITA: Natural Resources Dynamics: Another Look
SIEV 111.2004 Anna ALBERINI, Alistair HUNT and Anil MARKANDYA: Willingness to Pay to Reduce Mortality Risks:
Evidence from a Three-Country Contingent Valuation Study
KTHC 112.2004 Valeria PAPPONETTI and  Dino PINELLI: Scientific Advice to Public Policy-Making
SIEV 113.2004 Paulo A.L.D. NUNES and Laura ONOFRI: The Economics of Warm Glow: A Note on Consumer’s Behavior
and Public Policy Implications
IEM 114.2004 Patrick CAYRADE: Investments in Gas Pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas Infrastructure What is the Impact
on the Security of Supply?
IEM 115.2004 Valeria COSTANTINI and Francesco GRACCEVA:  Oil Security. Short- and Long-Term Policies
IEM 116.2004 Valeria COSTANTINI and Francesco GRACCEVA:  Social Costs of Energy Disruptions
IEM 117.2004 Christian EGENHOFER, Kyriakos GIALOGLOU, Giacomo LUCIANI, Maroeska BOOTS, Martin SCHEEPERS,
Valeria COSTANTINI, Francesco GRACCEVA, Anil MARKANDYA and Giorgio VICINI: Market-Based Options
for Security of Energy Supply
IEM 118.2004 David FISK: Transport Energy Security. The Unseen Risk?
IEM 119.2004 Giacomo LUCIANI: Security of Supply for Natural Gas Markets. What is it and What is it not?
IEM 120.2004 L.J. de VRIES and R.A. HAKVOORT: The Question of Generation Adequacy in Liberalised Electricity Markets
KTHC 121.2004 Alberto PETRUCCI: Asset Accumulation, Fertility Choice and Nondegenerate Dynamics in a Small Open
Economy
NRM 122.2004 Carlo GIUPPONI, Jaroslaw MYSIAK and Anita FASSIO: An Integrated Assessment Framework for Water
Resources Management: A DSS Tool and a Pilot Study Application
NRM 123.2004 Margaretha BREIL, Anita FASSIO, Carlo GIUPPONI and Paolo ROSATO: Evaluation of Urban Improvement
on the Islands of the Venice Lagoon: A Spatially-Distributed Hedonic-Hierarchical ApproachETA 124.2004 Paul MENSINK: Instant Efficient Pollution Abatement Under Non-Linear Taxation and Asymmetric
Information: The Differential Tax Revisited
NRM 125.2004 Mauro FABIANO, Gabriella CAMARSA, Rosanna DURSI, Roberta IVALDI, Valentina MARIN and Francesca
PALMISANI: Integrated Environmental Study for Beach Management:A Methodological Approach
PRA 126.2004 Irena GROSFELD and Iraj HASHI: The Emergence of Large Shareholders in Mass Privatized Firms: Evidence




 ROSON and Richard S.J. TOL: A General Equilibrium
Analysis of Climate Change Impacts on Tourism
CCMP 128.2004 Reyer GERLAGH: A Climate-Change Policy Induced Shift from Innovations in Energy Production to Energy
Savings
NRM 129.2004 Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Natural Resources, Innovation, and Growth
PRA 130.2004 Bernardo BORTOLOTTI and Mara FACCIO: Reluctant Privatization
SIEV 131.2004 Riccardo SCARPA and Mara THIENE: Destination Choice Models for Rock Climbing in the Northeast Alps: A
Latent-Class Approach Based on Intensity of Participation
SIEV 132.2004 Riccardo SCARPA Kenneth G. WILLIS and Melinda ACUTT: Comparing Individual-Specific Benefit Estimates
for Public Goods: Finite Versus Continuous Mixing in Logit Models
IEM 133.2004 Santiago J. RUBIO: On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax Revisited
ETA 134.2004 Ascensión ANDINA DÍAZ: Political Competition when Media Create Candidates’ Charisma
SIEV 135.2004 Anna ALBERINI: Robustness of VSL Values from Contingent Valuation Surveys
CCMP 136.2004 Gernot KLEPPER and Sonja PETERSON: Marginal Abatement Cost Curves in General Equilibrium: The
Influence of World Energy Prices
ETA 137.2004 Herbert DAWID, Christophe DEISSENBERG and Pavel ŠEVČIK: Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an
Environmental Taxation Game
CCMP 138.2004 ZhongXiang ZHANG: The World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund and China
CCMP 139.2004 Reyer GERLAGH and Marjan W. HOFKES: Time Profile of Climate Change Stabilization Policy
NRM 140.2004 Chiara D’ALPAOS and Michele MORETTO: The Value of Flexibility in the Italian Water Service Sector: A
Real Option Analysis
PRA 141.2004 Patrick BAJARI, Stephanie HOUGHTON and Steven TADELIS (lxxi): Bidding for Incompete Contracts
PRA 142.2004 Susan ATHEY, Jonathan LEVIN and Enrique SEIRA (lxxi): Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory
and Evidence from Timber Auctions(lix) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Mapping Diversity”, Leuven, May 16-
17, 2002
(lx) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory,
Evidence and Applications”, organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, September 26-
28, 2002
(lxi) This paper was presented at the Eighth Meeting of the Coalition Theory Network organised by
the GREQAM, Aix-en-Provence, France, January 24-25, 2003
(lxii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Communication across Cultures in
Multicultural Cities”, The Hague, November 7-8, 2002
(lxiii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Social dynamics and conflicts in
multicultural cities”, Milan, March 20-21, 2003
(lxiv) This paper was presented at the International Conference on “Theoretical Topics in Ecological
Economics”, organised by the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics - ICTP, the
Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei – FEEM
Trieste, February 10-21, 2003
(lxv) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory,
Evidence and Applications” organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and sponsored by the EU,
Milan, September 25-27, 2003
(lxvi) This paper has been presented at the 4th BioEcon Workshop on “Economic Analysis of
Policies for Biodiversity Conservation” organised on behalf of the BIOECON Network by
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice International University (VIU) and University College
London (UCL) , Venice, August 28-29, 2003
(lxvii) This paper has been presented at the international conference on “Tourism and Sustainable
Economic Development – Macro and Micro Economic Issues” jointly organised by CRENoS
(Università di Cagliari e Sassari, Italy) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, and supported by the
World Bank, Sardinia, September 19-20, 2003
(lxviii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Governance and Policies in
Multicultural Cities”, Rome, June 5-6, 2003
(lxix) This paper was presented at  the Fourth EEP Plenary Workshop and EEP Conference “The
Future of Climate Policy”, Cagliari, Italy, 27-28 March 2003
(lxx) This paper was presented at the 9
th Coalition Theory Workshop on “Collective Decisions and
Institutional Design”, organised by the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and held in Barcelona,
Spain, January 30-31, 2004
(lxxi) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory,
Evidence and Applications”, organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Consip and sponsored
by the EU, Rome, September 23-25, 20042003 SERIES
  CLIM Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti )
  GG Global Governance (Editor: Carlo Carraro)
  SIEV Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini)
  NRM Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi)
  KNOW Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano)
  IEM International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya)
  CSRM Corporate Social Responsibility and Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti)
  PRIV Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti)
  ETA Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro)
  CTN Coalition Theory Network
2004 SERIES
  CCMP Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti )
  GG Global Governance (Editor: Carlo Carraro)
  SIEV Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini)
  NRM Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi)
  KTHC Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano)
  IEM International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya)
  CSRM Corporate Social Responsibility and Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti)
  PRA Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti)
  ETA Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro)
  CTN Coalition Theory Network